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I. AnORNEYoCUENT PRIVILEGE 
(EVIDENCE CODE SECTIONS 9&0.962] 
A. Statutory Authority 
1. Evidence Code section 950 (Lawyer 
Defined) states: 
As used in this article, "lawyer" 
means a person authorized, or rea-
sonably believed by the client to be 
authorized, to practice law in any 
state or nation. 
2. Evidence Code section 951 (Client 
Defined) states: 
As used in this article, "client" 
means a person who, directly or 
through an authorized representa-
tive, consults a lawyer for the pur-
pose of retaining the lawyer or se-
curing legal service or advice from 
him in his professional capacity, and 
includes an incompetent (a) who 
himself so consults the lawyer or (b) 
whose guardian or conservator so 
consults the lawyer in behalf of the 
incompetent. 
3. Evidence Code section 952 (Confi-
dential Communication Between 
Client and Lawyer Defined) states: 
As used in this article, "confidential 
communication between client and 
lawyer" means information trans-
mitted between a client and his la w-
yer in the course of that relationship 
and in confidence by a means 
which, so far as the client is aware, 
discloses the information to no third 
persons other than those who are 
present to further the interest of the 
client in the consultation or those to 
whom disclosure is reasonably nec-
essary for the transmission of the in-
formation or the accomplishment of 
the purpose for which the lawyer is 
consulted, and includes a legal opin-
ion formed and the advice given by 
the lawyer in the course of that rela-
tionship. 
4. Evidence Code section 953 (Holder 
of Privilege Defined) states: 
As used in this article, "holder of the 
privilege" means: 
(a) The client when he has no 
guardian or conservator. 
(b) A guardian or conservator of 
the client when the client has a 
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guardian or conservator. when the communication is sought ticle as to a communication relevant 
(c) The personal representative of to be disclosed and is authorized to to an issue concerning the intention 
the client if the client is dead. claim the privilege under subdivi- or competence of a client executing 
(d) A successor, assign, trustee in sion (c) of Section 954. an attested document of which the 
dissolution, or any similar rep- lawyer is an attesting witness, or 
resentative of a firm, associa- 7. Evidence Code section 956 (Services concerning the execution or attesta-
tion, organization, partnership, of Lawyer Obtained to Aid in Com- tion of such a document. 
business trust, corporation, or mission of Crime or Fraud) states: 
public entity that is no longer in 12.Evidence Code section 960 Unten-
existence. There is no privilege under this ar- Hon of Deceased Client With Re-
ticle if the services of the lawyer spect to Writing Affecting Property 
5. Evidence Code section 954 (Who were sought or obtained to enable or Interest) states: 
May Claim Privilege) states: aid anyone to commit or plan to 
commit a crime or a fraud. There is no privilege under this ar-
Subject to Section 912 and except as ticle as to a communication relevant 
otherwise provided in this article, 8. Evidence Code section 956.5 (Rea- to an issue concerning the intention 
the client, whether or not a party, sonable belief that disclosure of con- of a client, now deceased, with re-
has a privilege to refuse to disclose, fidential communication is neces- spect to a deed of conveyance, will, 
and to prevent another from disclos- sary to prevent criminal act resulting or other writing, executed by the cli-
ing, a confidential communication in death or bodily harm; exception to ent, purporting to affect an interest 
between client and lawyer if the the privilege) states: in property. 
privilege is claimed by: 
(a) The holder of the privilege; There is no privilege under this ar- 13. Evidence Code section 961 (Validity 
(b) A person who is authorized to ticle if the lawyer reasonably be- of Writing Affecting Interest in 
claim the privilege by the lieves that disclosure of any confi- Property Executed by Deceased Cli-
holder of the privilege; or dential communication relating to ent in Issue) states: 
(c) The person who was the lawyer representation of a client is neces-
at the time of the confidential sary to prevent the client from com- There is no privilege under this ar-
communication, but such per- mitting a criminal act that the law- ticle as to a communication relevant 
son may not claim the privilege yer believes is likely to result in to an issue concerning the validity of 
if there is no holder of the privi- death or substantial bodily harm. a deed of conveyance, will, or other 
lege in existence or if he [she] is writing, executed by a client, now 
otherwise instructed by a per- 9. Evidence Code section 957 (Parties deceased, purporting to affect an 
son authorized to permit dis- Claiming Under Deceased Client) interest in property. 
closure. The relationship of at- states: 
torney and client shall exist be- 14. Evidence Code section 962 (Two or 
tween a law corporation as de- There is no privilege under this ar- More Clients Retaining Same Law-
fined in Article 10 (commenc- ticle as to a communication relevant yer in Matter of Common Interest) 
ing with Section 6160) of Chap- to an issue between parties all of states: 
ter 4 of Division 3 of the Busi- whom claim through a deceased cli-
ness and Professions Code and ent, regardless of whether the claims Where two or more dients have re-
the persons to whom it renders are by testate or intestate succession tained or consulted a lawyer upon a 
professional services, as well as or by inter vivos transaction. matter of common interest, none of 
between such persons and them, nor the successor in interest of 
members of the State Bar em- 10. Evidence Code section 958 (Breach any of them, may claim a privilege 
ployed by such corporation to of Duty Arising Out of Lawyer-Cli- under this article as to a communi-
render services to such persons. ent Relationship in Issue) states: cation made in the course of that re-
The word ""persons" as used lationship when such communica-
I 
in this subdivision includes There is no privilege under this ar- tion is offered in a civil proceeding 
partnerships, corporations, as- ticle as to a communication relevant between one of such clients (or his 
:! sociations and other groups to an issue of breach, by the lawyer successor in interest) and another of 
and entities. or by the client, of a duty arising out such clients (or his successor in in-
of the lawyer-client relationship. terest). 
6. Evidence Code section 955 (When 
Lawyer Must Claim Privilege) states: 11.Evidence Code section 959 (Inten- B. AUomey-cllent privilege: Rationale 
tion or Competence of Client Execut- andacope 
! The lawyer who received or made a ing Attested Document in Issue) The attorney-client privilege consti-communication subject to the privi- states: tutes a limitation on the admissibility of 
lege under this article shall claim the evidence as a means of preserving the 
i privilege whenever he is present There is no privilege under this ar- confidentiality of attorney-client com-I 
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munications. As defined by Evidence 
Code Section 954, the privilege autho-
rizes a client to refuse to disclose and to 
prevent others from disclosing, informa-
tion communicated in confidence to and 
by an attorney. Confidential communi-
cation exists when information is trans-
mitted between the attorney and the cli-
ent in the course of an attorney client re-
lationship. The communication must be 
made in confidence by a means which, in 
so far as the client is aware, discloses the 
information to no third person other than 
those who are present to further the in-
terest of the client in the consultation or 
those to whom disclosure is reasonably 
necessary for the transmission of the in-
formation for the accomplishment of the 
purpose for which the lawyer is con-
sulted. Confidential information in-
cludes a legal opinion formed and the 
advice given by the attorney in the 
course of that relationship. 
In People v. Meredith (1981) 29 Ca1.3d 
682,175 CaI.Rptr. 612, 631 P.2d 46, the 
California Supreme Court discussed the 
policy and rationale behind the attorney 
client privilege and stated: 
The fundamental purpose behind the 
attorney-client privilege is, of course, to 
encourage full and open communica-
tion between client and attorney. 'Ad-
equate legal representation in the 
ascertainment and enforcement of 
rights or the prosecution or defense of 
litigation compels a full disclosure of 
the facts by the client to his attorney. 
Given the privilege, a client may make 
such a disclosure without fear that his 
attorney may be forced to reveal the in-
formation confided to him .... In the 
criminal context, as we have recently 
observed, these poliCies assume par-
ticular significance. As a practical mat-
ter, if the client knows that damaging 
information could more readily be ob-
tained from the attorney following dis-
closure than from himself in the absence 
of disclosure, the client would be reluc-
tant to confide in his lawyer and it 
would be difficult to obtain fully in-
formed legal advice. Thus, if an accused 
is to derive the full benefit of his right to 
counsel, he must have the assurance of 
confidentiality and privacy of commu-
nication. (citations omitted) 29 Cal. 3d at 
690-691. 
1. Attorney-Client privilege protects 
information transmitted between 
attorney and client in the course of 
the attorney-client relationship. 
The attorney-client privilege protects 
only confidential communications be-
tween client and attorney. The person 
who is claiming the privilege has the 
burden of proving that an attorney-client 
relationship does exist. 
Evidence Code Section 951 defines 
"client" as a person who directly or 
through an authorized representative, 
consults an attorney for the purpose of 
retaining the attorney or securing legal 
advice from the attorney in a profes-
sional capacity. The definition includes 
an incompetent who consults a lawyer or 
whose guardian consults a lawyer on 
his/her behalf. Evidence Code Section 
950 defines "lawyer' as a person autho-
rized, or reasonably believed by the cli-
ent to be authorized, to practice law in 
any state or nation. An attorney-client 
relationship is prima facie established 
when a party seeking legal advice con-
sults an attorney and secures ad vice. The 
absence of a fee agreement does not pre-
vent the formation of the relationship. 
In People v. Canfield, (1974) 12 Cal.3d 
699,117 Cal. Rptr. 81, 527 P.2d 633, the 
defendant was convicted of auto theft. 
While the defendant was in jail, he was 
interviewed by a representative from the 
public defenders office during which a 
financial eligibility statement was taken. 
The prosecution introduced this state-
ment at trial to impeach the testimony of 
the defendant. The California Supreme 
Court held that the financial eligibility 
statement was protected under the attor-
ney client privilege, however, the error 
did not require reversal. In discussing 
the scope of the privilege the court stated: 
It is clear from the circumstances un-
der which the statement was given it 
was given in confidence (see Evid. 
Code Section 952) and that the de-
fendants purpose was to retain the 
public defender to represent him in 
the criminal proceedings against 
him. Under Evidence Code Section 
951 and 954 of the Evidence Code, 
therefore, any disclosures made by 
defendant in the course of the inter-
view were privileged and could not 
be revealed without his consent. 
The lawyer-client privilege is, in-
deed, so extensive that where a per-
son seeks the assistance of an attor-
ney with a view to employing him 
professionally, any information ac-
quired by the attorney is privileged 
whether or not the employment ac-
tually results.12 Cal. 3d at 704-705. 
In People v. Gardner (1980) 106 
Cal.App.3d 882, 165 Cal. Rptr. 415, the 
defendant was convicted of first degree 
murder. During the trial, the prosecution 
introduced a letter written by him to the 
public defender which contained an ad-
mission of guilt as well as seeking legal 
advice. The letter was seized from the 
defendant's jail cell. The court of appeal 
reversed and held that the letter was pro-
tected under the attorney-client privilege 
even though the letter had not yet been 
sent and no formal attorney-client rela-
tionship had been established. The court 
held: 
It is abundantly clear from the letter 
itself and from its context that the 
letter was intended for the office of 
the local public defender, and that it 
was written with the (quite reason-
able) expectation that [the defen-
dant] would be represented by that 
office. [The defendant] was an indi-
gent criminal accused, who, ... had 
been represented by the Monterey 
County Public Defender at least 
seven times prior to his arrest in this 
case. The letter was addressed 'To 
P.O.', it concluded by requesting 
advice, ad [the defendant] was in 
fact represented by the Monterey 
County Public defender in this pro-
ceeding. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 887. 
In Littlefield v. Superior Court (1982) 
136 Cal.App.3d 477, 186 Cal. Rptr. 368, 
Buono and Bianchi were charged with a 
series of murders. Bianchi entered a plea 
bargain which included a requirement 
that he testify against Buono. During the 
trial of Buono, defense counsel sought to 
cross-examine Bianchi about conversa-
tions which he had with his attorney con-
cerning the plea bargain and to subpoena 
all notes and records of those conversa-
tions from the public defenders office. 
The trial court ordered the witness to tes-
tify and for the public defender to pro-
duce the requested documents. The 
court of appeal issued a peremptory writ 
prohibiting the trial court from permit-
ting the cross examination and directing 
the trial court to quash the subpoena to 
the public defender's office. The court 
rejected the argument that the privilege 
is "near an end" since the threat of pun-
2nd & 3rd Quarters, 19' 
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ishrnent to Bianchi had dissipated. The 
court held that these discussions and 
notes are protected under the attorney 
client privilege: 
More significant, unlike the privi-
leges against self-incrimination, the 
attorney-client privilege continues 
even after the end of threat of pun-
ishment. The purpose of the attor-
ney-client privilege is to preserve 
the confidentiality of the informa-
tion. 136 Cal.App.3d at 482. 
The court also held that there the at-
torney client privilege was not waived 
merely because the client testified to facts 
that were possibly a topic of conversa-
tions with his defense counsel. 
In People v. Velasquez (1987) 192 
Cal.App.3d 322, 237 Cal.Rptr.366, the 
defendant was charged with various 
charges including murder and robbery. 
At trial, the government called a witness 
to testify to conversations that he had 
with the defendant in the jail, during 
which the defendant allegedly admitted 
his participation in the murder. Thewit-
ness was a "jailhouse lawyer" who con-
sulted with the defendant and agreed to 
help the defendant file some legal papers 
in his case. The defense objected, claim-
ing that these conversations were pro-
tected under the attorney-client privi-
lege. The court of appeal held that the 
conversations were not privileged be-
cause a jailhouse lawyer does not qualify 
as an attorney for purposes of the attor-
ney-client privilege: 
In enacting section 911 of the Evi-
dence Code the Legislature clearly 
intended to abolish common law 
privileges and to keep the courts 
from creating new nonstatutory 
privileges as a matter of judicial 
policy. 192 Cal.App.3d at 317. 
To come within the privilege, appel-
lant would have had to believe he was 
talking to a lawyer. However, appellant 
never testified, either at trial or the pre-
trial hearing on the motion to exclude the 
witness (jailhouse lawyer) from testify-
ing, that he believed (the witness) was an 
attorney ... While use of "jailhouse law-
yers" is not prohibited, it is not encour-
aged or promoted by state action; nor are 
such communications privileged. 192 
Cal.App.3d at 327-29. 
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In People v. Klvana (1992) 11 
Cal.App.4th 1679, 15Cal.Rptr.2d 512, the 
court of appeal rejected the defendant's 
argument of trial counsel failure to in-
voke the attorney-client privilege: 
"The defendant faulls his lrial cuun-
sel for failing to invoke the attorney-
client privilege when an 'attorney' 
with whom he had previously con-
sulted was called to the stand. This 
assertion is completely meritless 
since [the witness] testified that, at 
the time of her conversations with 
[the defendant], she informed him 
that she was no longer licensed and 
did not practice law." 11 
Cal.App.4th at 1724. 
In Hiott v. Superior Court (1993) 16 
Cal.App.4th 712, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 157, a 
civil case, the plaintiffs brother, an attor-
ney, visited the plaintiff while she was in 
the hospital. He initially came as her 
brother, but after seeing her condition, 
returned later with a video camera and 
began asking her questions about the 
accident. The court of appeal ruled that 
substantial evidence supported the trial 
court's inference that the ensuing video 
interview constituted attorney-client 
communication: 
"On January 4, 1990, [plaintiff's] 
brother visited her without a video 
camera. He was a 'concerned 
brother.' On January 6, 1990, her 
brother came to the hospital with a 
video camera, a fact she would have 
noted. When, after only a 'brief salu-
tation,' her brother began asking her 
questions (as an attorney gathering 
information for potential litigation') 
about the circumstances of her slip 
and fall-while recording his ques-
tions and her answers-it would 
have been obvious to her that this 
was not 'brother-sister talk' but 
rather 'client-lawyer communica-
tion.' Her responsive answers evi-
denced approval and confirmation 
of the lawyer-client relationship and 
its confidentiality." 16 Cal.App.4th 
at 7l8. 
2. Attorney-Client privilege protects 
only those communications which 
are made and intended to be in con-
fidence. 
A confidential communication in-
cludes a legal opinion formed and ad vice 
given by the attorney in the course of the 
relationship. A communication need not 
be exclUSively verbal, but may include 
signs, actions, or the content of papers or 
reports given to the client. An observa-
tion which is the direct product of a con-
fidential communication may also be 
protected. 
In Re Navarro (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 
325, 155 Cal. Rptr. 522, an attorney who 
represented a defendant in a robbery 
case was called to testify at the prelimi-
nary hearing of that same defendant in a 
murder charge. The attorney was asked 
whether she had shown the defendant an 
arrest report which may have provided 
the motive for the murder. The magis-
trate found the attorney in contempt and 
ordered her to respond finding that the 
question was not within the attorney cli-
ent privilege. The superior court granted 
a writ of habeas corpus discharging the 
contempt order. The court of appeal af-
firmed and held: 
Nor are we persuaded by the 
people's contention that a publica-
tion which is in the public domain is 
somehow per se nonconfidential. 
Once an attorney has determined 
that a particular publication is rel-
evant to his inmate-client's case, that 
publication may become an integral 
part of the attorney's legal ad vice or 
strategy and, as such, it would be 
entitled to ... protection. 93 Cal. App. 
3d at 329. 
A lawyers act of handing a police re-
port to his client (if such be the fact) was 
a confidential communication privileged 
under Evidence Code Section 952. [The 
attorney] was duty bound to raise the 
privilege on behalf of her client.(Evid. 
Code Section 955).93 Cal.App.3d at 330-
331. 
Communications between an attor-
ney and a client who is in jail or in 
prison are confidential. In fact, Pe-
nal Code 851.5 makes it a misde-
meanor for the police to monitor, 
eavesdrop on, or record a telephone 
call by an arrested person to a re-
tained attorney, the public defender, 
or an attorney assigned by the court. 
Penal Code Section 636 makes it a 
felony for any person to eavesdrop 
5 
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on or record by electronic device, 
without permission from all parties 
to the conversation, any portion of a 
conversation between any person in 
custody or on the property of a law 
enforcement agency and his or her 
lawy<>r, doctor, or religious advisor. 
Penal Code Section 2601(b) pro-
vides that a sentence of imprison-
ment in state prison does not de-
prive an inmate of the right to corre-
spond confidentially with any 
member of the State Bar, provided 
only that prison officials may open 
and inspect such mail to search for 
contraband. 
In Barber v. Municipal Court (1979) 24 
Ca1.3d 742,760,157 Cal.Rptr. 658, 598 
P.2d 818, the California Supreme Court 
established that a prisoner has the right 
to consult with his or her attorney in ab-
solute privacy even when the interests of 
security in the administration of the 
prison are considered. 
In In re Jordan (1974) 12 Cal.3d 575, 
577-578, 116 Cal.Rptr. 371,526 P.2d 523 
the court held that an institutional rule 
that treated attorney-inmate mail as non-
privileged material was invalid because 
it was inconsistent with the rights af-
forded prisoners under former Penal 
Code Section 2600(2) [now see Penal 
Code section 2601(b)]. The court also 
held that while the authorities were per-
mitted to open mail to search for contra-
band, they were not permitted to read 
the mail to search for "verbal" contra-
band. 
In People v. Meredith (1981) 29 Ca1.3d 
682, 175 CaLRptr. 612, 631 P.2d 46, the 
defendant was charged with murder and 
robbery. A defense investigator, at the 
request of defense counsel, had retrieved 
the victims' wallet from behind the 
defendant's house, brought it to the at-
torney, who examined it and turned it 
over to the police. At trial, the prosecu-
tion called the defense investigator to tes-
tify as to his observations of the wallet. 
All parties agreed that the wallet itself 
was properly admitted into evidence 
and that any conversations between the 
defendant, the investigator and the attor-
ney are confidential. The issue was 
whether the investigators' observations, 
which were the product of a privileged 
communication, are also protected un-
der the attorney-client privilege. The 
court held that the attorney-dient privi-
lege protects not only the initial commu-
nications, but extends to information 
which the attorney learns or receives as a 
result of that communication. However, 
the court crafted an exception to the 
privilege where the defense has altered 
or removed evidence. The court held: 
[W]e conclude that an observation 
by defense counselor his investiga-
tor, which is the product of a privi-
leged communication, may not be 
admitted unless the defense, by al-
tering or removing physical evi-
dence has precluded the prosecu-
tion from making the same observa-
tion. In the present case the defense 
investigator, by removing the wal-
let, frustrated any possibility that 
the police might later discover it in 
the trash can. The conduct of the 
defense thus precluded the prosecu-
tion from ascertaining the crucial 
fact of the location of the wallet. 
Under these circumstances, the 
prosecution was entitled to present 
evidence to show the location of the 
wallet in the trash can. 29 Cal.3d at 
686-687. 
The court further stated: 
We thus view the defense decision 
to remove evidence as a tactical 
choice. If the defense counsel leaves 
the evidence where he discovers it, 
his observations derived from the 
privileged communications are in-
sulted from revelation. If, however, 
counsel chooses to remove evidence 
to examine or test it, the original 10-
cation and condition of that evi-
dence loses the protection of the 
privilege. 29 Ca1.3d at 695. 
It is not clear whether the California 
statute, which renders it a misdemeanor 
willfully to conceal evidence with intent 
to prevent it from being produced (Penal 
Code section 135), requires the attorney 
to disclose the information or whether 
the attorney's general duty to protect the 
client's secrets prevails. The latter is 
probably more in keeping with the spirit 
of the attorney-client relationship. 
In People v. Superior Court (Fairbank) 
(1987) 192 Cal.App. 3d 32, 237 Cal. Rptr. 
158, the defendant was charged with first 
degree murder. The government re-
quested the court to order defense coun-
sel to either physically produce or pro-
vide information about the murder 
weapons which he learned about from 
his client. The trial court would not issue 
an order. The government petitioned the 
court of appeal for a writ of mandate to 
compel the trial court to order produc-
tion and the court of appeal issued the 
writ. The court noted that it was optimis-
tic that defense counsel would satisfy 
his/her obligations to the court, but that 
the proceedings made clear that the exact 
nature of that obligation may not have 
been understood. 
The court cited two cases as proViding 
the parameters by which to asses the 
facts in this case. First, People v. Meredith 
(1981) 29 Cal. 3d 682, 175 Cal. Rptr. 612, 
631 P.2d 46, which established two basic 
principles; first, that the attorney-client 
privilege is "not strictly limited to com-
munications, but extends to protect ob-
servations made as a consequence of pro-
tected communications"; and second 
that whenever defense counsel removes 
or alters evidence the statutory privilege 
does not bar disclosure of the original 
location and condition of that evidence. 
192 Cal.App.3d at 35-36. 
The second case was Goldsmith v. Su-
perior Court (1984) 152 Cal. App. 3d 76, 
199 Cal. Rptr. 366 where the court upheld 
the attorney-client privilege and did not 
compel the defense attorney to disclose 
the whereabouts of a certain weapon 
where the attorney indicated that he 
"neither possessed the gun nor had con-
trol over it" and there was no indication 
that he had ever moved or altered it. 192 
Cal. App.3d at 36. 
The court reasoned that both of those 
cases differ in certain respect but provide 
guidance as to what counsel must do: 
Defense counsel's obligations are to 
the court and their client. Hence, 
counsel cannot disclose whether 
they have ordo not have the items in 
questions. If they do not, then that is 
the end of the issue insofar as the 
case is concerned. If they are aware 
of the location of the items, and have 
not taken possession of the them, 
then counsel can satisfy their ethica I 
obligations to both the court and 
their client by leaving the items 
where they are in accordance with 
the holding of Meridith. [sic] In the 
event that defense counsel are in 
need of the items sought, they can-
2nd & 3rd Quarters, 1994 
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not secret or destroy the items. 192 
CaL App.3d at 37. 
In People v. Lee (1970) 3 Cal. App.3d 
514,83 Cal. Rptr. 715 the defendant was 
convicted of murder. After his arrest, the 
ddendant called hi~ father to tell where 
his bloody shoes were hidden. The father 
called the defendant's wife who deliv-
ered the shoes to the Public defender's 
office who then turned it over to the 
Judge. During trial, the government se-
cured possession of the shoes. The court 
held that the seizure of the shoes by the 
government did not violate any attor-
ney-client privilege. The court further 
held that testimony from representatives 
of the public defender's office that they 
received the shoes from the defendant's 
wife and turned them over to the judge 
was also not protected. 3 Cal. App.3d at 
526-527. 
3. Attorney-dient privilege does not 
protect disclosures which are made 
in order to gain assistance for a crime 
ora fraud. 
Evidence Code Section 956 provides 
that there is no attorney-client privilege if 
the services of the lawyer were sought or 
obtained to enable or aid anyone to com-
mit or plan to commit a crime or a fraud. 
Thus, when a client makes a statement 
that he or she is about to commit a future 
criminal act, that statement is not privi-
leged. However, a prima facie showing 
must be made that the clients purpose in 
consulting the attorney was to obtain 
advice concerning the perpetration of a 
crime or fraud before the communication 
will be received in evidence over a claim 
of privilege. Nowell v. Superior Court 
(1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 652,657,36 Cal. 
Rptr.21. 
This exception is narrower than the 
corresponding exception to the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege under Evi-
dence Code Section 1018. Under that ex-
ception, the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege does not apply if the services of 
the psychotherapist are sought or assist 
in the planning or commission or a crime 
or a tort. Under the exception to the attor-
ney-client privilege, the assistance must 
besought fora crime ora fraud, and a tort 
is insu fficient. 
A party claiming that the services of 
an attorney were sought for aid in com-
mitting a crime or fraud must establish 
that claim by independent evidence be· 
fore disclosure of attorney-client com-
munications can be required. 
In People v. Pic'1(1981) 114Cal. App.3d 
824,171 CaL Rptr. 106, an attorney and 
another man were found guilty of con-
spiracy, extortion and receiving stolen 
property. During trial, the attorney testi-
fied to certain matters and was ordered 
by the court to disclose the name of the 
client! co-defendant who had tele-
phoned him about making arrange-
ments to return certain stolen property to 
the victim. The court held that this infor-
mation was not to be protected within 
the attorney-client privilege: 
The name of the client who consults 
a lawyer about a criminal matter 
should, normally, be deemed a con-
fidential communication for the 
purpose of the lawyer-client privi-
lege .... [The] defendant [attorney] 
was also foreclosed from validly as-
serting the lawyer-client privilege 
by virtue of the crime exception to 
this privilege, created by Evidence 
Code Section 956. As discussed pre-
viously, the evidence established 
that [the client] had sought the ser-
vices of defendant Pic'l, an attorney, 
to aid in the criminal plan to have 
the stolen property ... returned to 
[the victim] upon his payment of 
$2,500 and the execution of a non-
prosecution agreement. 114 CaL 
App. 3d at 883-884. 
In Nowell v. Superior Court (1963) 223 
Cal. App. 2d 652, 657, 36 CaL Rptr. 21, the 
appellate court vacated a discovery or-
der requiring a defendant in a libel case 
to disclose information concerning a con-
sultation he had with his attorney. The 
consultation concerned his contem-
plated publication of the allegedly libel-
ous material that was the subject of the 
action. Holding that the discovery order 
could not be justified on the basis that the 
defendant had consulted with the attor-
ney for aid in committing a crime or 
fraud, the court stated: 
The attorney-client privilege does 
not extend to communications be-
tween the attorney and client "hav-
ing to do with the client's contem-
plated criminal acts, or in aid or fur-
therance thereof .... " [citations 
omitted] Similarly, when the client 
seeks advice that will serve him in 
the contemplated perpetration of a 
fraud there is no privilege. [citation 
omitted I Real party in interest 
makes charges attempting to bring 
this case within these exceptions. 
But it would be destructive of the 
privilege to require disclosure on 
the mere assertion of opposing 
counsel. "Accordingly, evidence 
should be presented to make a 
prima facie showing that this was 
the client's purpose (to commit a 
crime) before the communication is 
received (into evidence}." [citation 
omitted] 58 American Jurisprudence 
says: "The mere charge of illegality 
will not defeat the privilege. There 
must be prima facie evidence that 
the illegality has some foundation in 
fact." 223 CaLApp.2d at 657. 
In Dickerson v. Superior Court (1982) 
135 Cal.App.3d 93, 185 Cal.Rptr. 97, an 
attorney petitioned the court of appeal 
for a writ to set aside an order by the su-
perior court directing him to answer 
questions at a deposition. Dickerson 
claimed that the order violates the attor-
ney client privilege. The court of appeal 
granted the writ without prejudice for 
the superior court to review whether the 
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-cli-
ent applies pursuant to Evidence Code 
Section 956. With respect to whether this 
exception would apply the court ob-
served: 
Had the issue been brought before 
respondent court, it is possible that 
an exception might have been found 
in the enactment nullifying the 
privilege "if the services of the law-
yer were sought or obtained to en-
able or aid anyone to commit or plan 
to commit a crime or fraud." The 
communications between Chandler 
and Dickerson were allegedly made 
in furtherance of a fraud. However, 
a mere allegation of fraud is insuffi-
cient to make the exception appli-
cable. Thus, had a prima facie show-
ing of fraudulent purpose been 
made, the discovery order would 
have been proper. 135Cal.App.3d at 
100. 
In People v. Clark (1990) 50 Ca1.3d 583, 
268 CaLRptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that although 
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a psychotherapist-patient privilege did 
not apply when the psychotherapist dis-
closed a threat made by the defendant 
during therapy sessions, the attorney-cli-
ent privilege applied to render the disclo-
sure inadmissible at trial. The court ob-
served that since the psychotherapist 
had been appointed to assist defense 
counsel the attorney-client privilege 
which therefore arose was not waived by 
the psychotherapist's disclosure. In dis-
cussing the attorney-client privilege, 
however, the Clark court explained the 
parameters of the crime! fraud exception 
to the attorney-client privilege: 
The attorney-client privilege does 
not encompass communications be-
tween attorney and client that are in-
tended to further future criminal 
conduct. 
Cases decided since adoption of the 
Evidence Code recognize the limited na-
ture of the exception to the attorney-cli-
ent privilege created by Evidence Code 
section 95.6: "This exception is invoked 
only when a client seeks or obtains legal 
assistance 'to enable or aid' one to com-
mit a crime or fraud. The quoted lan-
guage clearly requires an intention on the 
part of the client to abuse the attorney-
client relationship ... "50 Cal.3d 583,622-
623. 
4. Attorney-client privilege does not 
protect disclosures which the attor-
ney believes are necessary to prevent 
the client from committing a crimi-
nal act that the lawyer believes is 
likely to result in death or substan-
tial bodily harm. 
In 1993, Evidence Code section 956.5 
was added to create an exception to the 
attorney-client privilege when the law-
yer reasonably believes that disclosure of 
the confidential communication relating 
to representation of the client is neces-
sary to prevent the client from commit-
ting a criminal act that the lawyer be-
lieves is likely to result in death or sub-
stantial bodily harm. 
A comparable provision is that of Evi-
dence Code section 1024, which creates an 
exception to the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege if the psychotherapist has rea-
sonable cause to believe that the patient is 
dangerous to another person and that dis-
closure of the communication is necessary 
to prevent the threatened danger. In 
People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583,268 
Cal.Rptr. 399,789 P.2d 127, at the request 
of defense counsel, a psychotherapist was 
appointed to examine the defendant. In 
conversations with that psychotherapist, 
the defendant threatened to kill two 
people. The psychotherapist consulted 
with her attorney and arranged for her 
attorney to inform the potential victims of 
the threats, thus revealing the communi-
cation. The California Supreme Court 
held that the threats were no longer confi-
dential under the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege: 
Defendant contends that the state-
ments were confidential, and be-
cause they were made ina confiden-
tial relationship prior to the time 
[the psychotherapist] told him she 
might have to reveal them, he had 
not waived the confidential nature 
ofthe communication. We need not 
decide the waiver question to re-
solve this claim, however, because 
at the time of the trial [the psycho-
therapist] had already revealed the 
communications that were, there-
fore, no longer confidentiaL 
A psychotherapist has a profesSional 
duty to maintain the confidential charac-
ter of communications made to him by 
his patient during the course of the rela-
tionship, but when it is necessary to dis-
close confidential information to avert 
danger to others the therapist must do so. 
The purpose underlying Evidence Code 
section 1014 is not to prevent the use of a 
defendant's statement against him in le-
gal proceedings. It exists to prevent the 
unnecessary disclosure of statements 
made in confidence in the course of a 
privileged communication with a thera-
pist and thereby to facilitate treatment. If 
the statements have been revealed to 
third persons in a communication that is 
not itself privileged, however, they are 
no longer confidentiaL 
The question is not whether the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege has been 
waived or the exception that would per-
mit compelled disclosure in a legal pro-
ceeding applies, but whether the privi-
lege may be claimed at all once the com-
munication is no longer confidential. 
Whether the psychotherapist 'reason-
ably believes' (Evid.Code sec. 1024) that 
D E R 
revelation of the communication is nec-
essary also becomes irrelevant once the 
communication has lost its confidential 
status. The reason for the privilege--
protecting the patient's right to privacy 
and promoting the therapeutic relation-
ship-and thus the privilege itself, disap-
pear once the communication is no 
longer confidential. 50 Cal. 3d at 619-620. 
The Court, however, found that be-
cause the psychotherapist had been ap-
pointed to assist the defense attorney, the 
communication was still privileged by 
the attorney-client privilege: 
The attorney-client privilege serves a 
different purpose. It exists to permit 
a client to freely and frankly reveal 
confidential information, including 
past criminal conduct, to the attorney 
or others whose purpose is to assist 
the attorney, and to thereby enable 
the attorney to adequately represent 
the client. In a criminal case the privi-
lege also serves to preserve the 
defendant's privilege against self-in-
crimination that might otherwise be 
deemed to have been waived by his 
revelation of incriminating informa-
tion. To make adequate representa-
tion possible, therefore, these privi-
leges assure criminal defendants that 
confidential statements to their attor-
ney will not be adrnissible in any pro-
ceeding. 
The Legislature has recognized this 
distinction on purpose in Evidence Code 
section 1024, where it provides that there 
is no [psychotherapist-patient privilege] 
if the therapist believes it is necessary to 
disclose the communication. No similar 
provision reflects an intent that the attor-
ney-client privilege terminate if a com-
munication to an attorney is made public 
without a waiver of confidentiality by 
the client. Since defendant's statements 
to [the psychotherapist] were also com-
munications made in the attorney-client 
relationship, unless defendant waived 
the privilege or did not intend that the 
statements be confidential, they contin-
ued to be privileged notwithstanding the 
fact that they were no longer confidential 
at the time of triaL 50 CaL3d at 620-21. 
The 1993 addition of Evidence Code 
section 956.5 appears to have partially 
abrogated the latter language in Clark, by 
providing a statute reflecting an intent 
that the attorney-client privilege termi-
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nate if the attorney believes that disclo-
sure is necessary to prevent the death or 
bodily injury to another person. Thus, it 
now appears that Clark's ruling with re-
gard to the loss of confidentiality from a 
psychotherapist's disclosure of commu-
nication may apply with equal force to a 
comparable disclosure, under compa-
rable circumstances, by an attorney of a 
defendant's threat to kill or harm another 
person. 
However, Clark may have survived 
insofar as it held that when a psycho-
therapist reveals a threat made by the 
defendant during therapy sessions, the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege is no 
longer applicable but the attorney-client 
privilege remains applicable.lt may now 
be that, under these circumstances when 
both privileges are at play, both the psy-
chotherapist and the attorney would 
have to disclose the threat, or arguably at 
least both reasonably believe that disclo-
sure is necessary to prevent death or 
bodily harm, for its confidentiality as to 
both privileges to be lost. (See 
F.2.b.:A.B.A. Model Rule 1.6, and F.3., 
below) 
5. Attorney·client privilege does not 
protect disclosures relevant to an is-
sue of breach. 
No privilege protects a confidential 
communication between an attorney and 
client when the communication is rel-
evant to an issue of breach, by either the 
attorney or the client, of a duty arising 
out of the attorney-client relationship. 
(E vidence Code section 958)(See Glade v. 
Superior Court (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 738, 
746-7, 143 Cal.Rptr.119) Thus, when a 
criminal defendant fled and claimed af-
ter he was apprehended that his attorney 
had counseled his flight, the attorney-cli-
ent privilege did not prevent disclosure 
by the attorney at a hearing on the 
defendant's motion for a new trial of the 
defendant's statements to the attorney 
relevant to his disappearance. People v. 
Vargas (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 516,525-528, 
126 Cal.Rptr. 88. In a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding arising out of a criminal 
defendant's claim of incompetence of 
counsel, the attorney-client privilege be-
tween the defendant and the challenged 
attorney is waived concerning those 
matters put in issue by the defendant. 
Inad equa te representa tion of counselis a 
charge of a breach of duty arising out of 
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the attorney-client relationship; thus, the 
privilege does not apply in this context. 
6. Attorney-client privilege does not 
protect disclosures which are made 
to third persons unless these disclo-
sures are made to persons to further 
the interest of the client or to accom-
plish the purpose for which the at-
torney was consulted. 
Under Evidence Code section 952, to 
be a confidential communication be-
tween attorney and client, the communi-
cation must not be disclosed to a third 
person other than one who is present to 
further the interest of the client in the 
communication or to whom disclosure is 
reasonably necessary for the transmis-
sion of the information or the accom-
plishment of the purpose for which the 
lawyer is consulted. 
The Law Revision Commission Com-
ment to Evidence Code Section 952 states 
in pertinent part: 
Confidential communications also 
include those made to third par-
ties-such as the lawyer's secretary, 
a physician, or similar expert-for 
the purpose of transmitting such 
information to the lawyer because 
they are "reasonably necessary for 
the transmission of the informa-
tion ... " 
A lawyer at times may desire to have 
a client reveal information to an expert 
consultant in order that the lawyer may 
adequately advise his client. The inclu-
sion of the words "or the accomplish-
ment of the purpose for which the lawyer 
is consulted" assures that these commu-
nications, too, are within the scope of the 
privilege. This part of the definition may 
change existing law ... 
The words "other than those who are 
present to further the interest of the client 
in the consultation" indicate that a com-
munication to a lawyer is nonetheless 
confidential even though it is made in the 
presence of another person-such as a 
spouse, parent, business associate or 
joint client-who is present to further the 
interest of the client in the consultation. 
These words refer too, to another person 
and his attorney who may meet with the 
client and his attorney in regard to a 
matter of joint concern. 
In Barber v. Municipal Court, etc., the 
defendant sought a writ of prohibition to 
dismiss the criminal charges. The defen-
dants alleged that their Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel had been violated 
by the presence of a government agent in 
an undercover capacity at their confiden-
tial attorney-client meetings. TheCalifor-
nia Supreme Court granted the writ and 
held: 
The right to counsel, which embod-
ies the right to private consultation 
with counsel, is violated when a 
state agent [in an undercover capac-
ity 1 is present at confidential attor-
ney-client conferences ... The fact that 
the petitioners discussed their de-
fenses with joint counsel in a confer-
ence type setting rather than in a 
one-on-one session does not dimin-
ish their right of confidentiality. 24 
CaL 3d at 752, 754. 
In People v. Lines, (1975) 13 C.3d 500, 
119 Cal. Rptr225,531 P.2d 793, thedefen-
dant was charged with the murder of his 
aunt. He entered pleas of not guilty and 
not guilty by reason of insanity. After a 
bifurcated trial, the defendant was found 
both guilty and sane. The defendant 
claims that it was error for the court to 
admit, over objection, the testimony of 
two court-appointed psychiatrists in vio-
lation of his attorney-client privilege. The 
two doctors were initially appointed by 
the court under Evidence Code Section 
1017. The California Supreme Court held 
that, pursuant to an appointment under 
Evidence Code Section 1017, any com-
munication between the defendant and 
the doctors was protected under the at-
torney-client privilege: 
Where, as here, pursuant to section 
1017 of the Evidence Code, a psycho-
therapist is appointed by the court in 
a criminal proceeding to examine the 
defendant in order to provide the 
defendant's attorney with informa-
tion for the purposes set forth in said 
section, the results of such examina-
tion, including any report thereof, 
and all infornlation and communica-
tions relating thereto, are protected 
from disclosure by the attorney-client 
privilege notwithstanding the fact 
that the defendant has theretofore or 
thereafter tendered in said proceed-
ing the issue of his mental or emo-
tional condition. 13 Ca1.3d at 514. 
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The court, however, found that the 
error was not suffidently prejudidal to 
the defendant to warrant reversal. Two 
other doctors testified at the trial who 
were appointed pursuant to Penal Code 
Section 1027 which requires the court to 
appoint two psychiatrists to examine the 
defendant after he/~he ha~ rah;ed a de-
fense of not guilty by reason of insanity. 
These psychiatrists may be called by ei-
ther party or by the court. Any state-
ments made by the defendant to the doc-
tors appointed under Penal Code section 
1027 are not privileged under the attor-
ney-client privilege. Since the testimony 
which was admitted by the doctors ap-
pointed pursuant to Penal Code section 
1027 was essentially the same as that 
from the doctors appointed pursuant to 
Evidence Code section 1017, the Court 
found no prejudice. The Court, however, 
did disapprove the practice of appoint-
ing the same doctor under the two Evi-
dence Code sections. Since the communi-
cations given under the first appoint-
ment are privileged, and those under the 
second appointment are not, it may im-
pose an impossible task for the doctor to 
compartmentalize the information and 
not rely upon or use any information that 
is deemed privileged. 
An expert loses his or her status as a 
consulting agent of the attorney if the 
attorney calls the expert to the witness 
stand. Once the witness is called, neither 
the attorney-client privilege nor the 
work-product doctrine apply to matters 
relied on or considered in the formation 
of his or her opinion. People v. Milner 
(1988) 45 Ca1.3d 227, 241, 246 Cal.Rptr. 
713,753 P.2d 669. 
In People v. Haskett (1990) 52 CaL3d 
210,276 Cal.Rptr. 80,801 P.2d 323, the 
California Supreme Court rejected a 
claim that calling a psychotherapist to 
the stand at a first trial did not waive the 
attorney-client privilege: 
In the trial court, defendant invoked 
only the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege ... The privilege was 
waived, however, when defendant 
called [the psychotherapist] to tes-
tify on his behalf at the first triaL On 
appeal, defendant invokes for the 
first time the attorney-client privi-
lege on the mistaken assumption 
that it has survived the waiver ofthe 
psychotherapist-patient privilege. 
People v. Clark (1990) 50 Ca1.3d 583, 
discussing the differences between 
the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege and the attorney-client privi-
lege, agreed that statements made to 
a psychotherapist may be made in 
the attorney-client relationship and, 
"unless defendant waived the privi-
lege or did not intend that the state-
ments be confidential, they contin-
ued to be privileged notwithstand-
ing the fact that they were no longer 
confidential at the time of tria!." The 
defendant's statements in Clark 
were revealed to potential victims 
and were thus no longer confiden-
tial at the time of trial, but in Clark, 
the defendant had at no time 
waived the privilege. 
As the People argue, here defendant 
did waive the privilege when [the psy-
chotherapist] was called to the stand by 
the defense in the first trial. 52 Ca1.3d at 
242-43. 
A disclosure may be made for a lim-
ited purpose under certain circum-
stances, thereby not waiving the attor-
ney-client privilege. In People v. Aguilar 
(1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1556,267 Cal.Rptr. 
879, a psychological expert was ap-
pointed to aid the defense. Pursuant to 
the requirements of Evidence Code sec-
tion 795, the defendant underwent hyp-
nosis in the psychological sessions. The 
defendant later sought to testify at trial, 
requiring a hearing on the admissibility 
of his posthypnosis testimony. For these 
purposes only, the defendant agreed that 
the prosecutor could review videotapes 
of the hypnosis sessions. The trial court 
ruled that the statements made in the 
videotapes could be used by the prosecu-
tor as impeachment evidence at trial. The 
court of appeal held that the ruling was 
error, but that the error was not prejudi-
cial requiring reversal: 
The defendant's waiver of the [attor-
ney-client] privilege against disclo-
sure of his interviews with the hyp-
notist was occasioned by the trial 
court's erroneous application ofEvi-
dence Code section 795 to his testi-
mony. The waiver was not only lim-
ited to the hearing on admiSSibility 
of his posthypnosis testimony, it 
was also freely and voluntaril y 
made. However, ... the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 218 Cal.App.3d at 1565-66. 
7. Assertion of the Privilege: The client 
or his or her attorney may claim the 
privilege and in certain instances the 
attorney must claim the privilege. 
Subject to Evidence Code Section 912, 
which governs waiver of privileges by 
disclosure, the client, whether or not a 
party to a particular action has a privilege 
to refuse to disclose, and to prevent an-
other from disclosing, a confidential 
communication between the client and 
his or her attorney. 
The attorney who received or made a 
confidential communication must claim 
the privilege whenever he or she is 
present when the communication is 
sought to be disclosed. Thus, while the 
attorney client privilege belongs only to 
the client, the attorney is professionally 
obligated to claim it on the client's behalf 
whenever the opportunity arises unless 
the client has instructed otherwise. 
c. Waiver of the AttomeyoCllent privilege 
1. The attorney-client privilege may 
only be waived by the client's 
uncoerced disclosure of all, or a sub-
stantial part, of a privileged commu-
nication, or by a failure to claim the 
privilege when the client has the le-
gal standing and opportunity to as-
sert the claim. 
Evidence Code Section 912 provides 
that a waiver of the attorney-client privi-
lege may be found "if any holder of the 
privilege, without coercion, has dis-
closed a significant part of the communi-
cation or has consented to such disclo-
sure made by anyone". Waiver depends 
upon actual, and not potential disclosure 
of confidential communications. Failure 
to object to evidence may constitute a 
waiver of the priVilege. 
In Maas v. Municipal Court (1985) 175 
Cal.App.3d 601, 221 Cal. Rptr. 245, the 
defendant was charged with murder by 
complaint. A witness in the case entered 
into a plea bargain with the government 
in which she agreed to testify against the 
defendant. The attorneys for the defen-
dant issued subpoenas to the lawyers for 
this witness asking them to produce 
documents concerning their client argu-
ing that she had waived any attorney-cli-
ent privilege by entering into the plea 
agreement. The magistrate ordered the 
lawyers to produce the documents and 
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the Superior Court issued a writ ordering 
the magistrate to vacate his order. The 
court of appeal affirmed the writ holding 
that when the witness entered into a 
written plea agreement and was granted 
immunity, she had not waived her attor-
ney client privilege. The court held: 
[Tjhe waiver of a privilege must be a 
voluntary and knowing act, done 
with sufficient awareness of the rel-
evant circumstances and likely con-
sequences, ... While a -qritten immu-
nity agreement might include an 
unambiguous waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege among its 
temls, clearly the agreement at issue 
in this case did not. 175 CaL App.3d 
at 603. 
In People v. Tamborrino, (1989) 215 CaL 
App. 3d 575, 263 CaL Rptr. 731, the court 
held that a witness did not waive the at-
torney-client privilege by testifying to 
the same facts he related to his attorney. 
In this robbery prosecution, the defen-
dant testified the victim was accusing 
him of the robbery to get even with him 
for selling her fake narcotics. At the con-
clusion of his testimony the trial judge 
asked the defendant, ""Did you tell your 
lawyer about the story you just related 
on the stand 7" Defense counsel objected 
that the answer would violate the 
defendant's attorney-client privilege. 
The trial judge overruled the objection 
but the appellate court held the question 
was improper. The court stated: 
Defendant' 5 testimony concerning 
facts that might have been previ-
ously related by him to his counsel is 
not equivalent to disclosure by him 
of the actual content of an attorney-
client communication, and does not 
constitute a waiver of the privilege. 
He testified only to fads supporting 
his defense ... he did not testify con-
cerning, nor did any of his testi-
mony relate to any communication 
he might have had with his counseL 
263 CaLRptr. at 734. 
In People v. Poulin (1972) 27 
CaLApp.3d 54, 103 CaL Rptr. 623, the 
defendant was convicted of explosion of 
a destructive device. During trial, while 
the victim was describing the bomb 
which injured him, the bailiff saw the 
defendant gesture to his attorney and say 
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"It was not quite like that". The govern-
ment called the bailiff as a witness and 
the defendant made no objection to the 
testimony as privileged. On appeal the 
court found no error and stated: 
[Tlhe fdilure tu ubject tu its ddmi5sion 
or to claim the privilege resulted in a 
waiver thereof(Evid. Code Section 
912).27 CaLApp.3d at 64. 
2. Attorney-client privilege is waived 
as to matters put is issue on any 
question of breach of a duty arising 
out of the lawyer-client relationship. 
Evidence Code Section 958 provides 
that there is no privilege as to a commu-
nication relevant to an issue of breach, by 
the lawyer or by the client, of a duty aris-
ing out of the lawyer-client relationship. 
The Law Revision Commission com-
ment to Evidence Code Section 958 
states: 
It would be unjust to permit a client 
either to accuse his attorney of a 
breach of duty and to invoke the 
privilege to prevent the attorney 
from bringing forth evidence in de-
fense of the charge or to refuse to 
pay his attorney's fee and invoke the 
privilege to defeat the attorney's 
claim. Thus, for example, if the de-
fendant in a criminal action claims 
that his lawyer did not provide him 
with an adequate defense, commu-
nications between the lawyer and 
client relevant to that issue are not 
privileged. 
In re Dudley Gray (1981) 123 
CaLApp.3d 614, 176 CaLRptr. 72, an at-
torney was held in contempt for refusing 
to answer questions at a habeas proceed-
ing brought by a former client who was 
alleging ineffective assistance of counseL 
The court on appeal denied the applica-
tionfora writ of habeas corpus and held: 
We hold that there is no attorney-cli-
ent privilege as to matters put in is-
sue in a habeas corpus proceeding 
where the competency of 
defendant's trial attorney is at 
issue ... [However], we are limiting 
our holding to matters put in issu~ 
by the petition. Therefore, the peti-
tioner is not going to get bush-
whacked. The privilege is waived 
only as to issues raised in the peti-
tion he or she elects to file ... Of 
course, if during an evidentiary 
hearing a defendant discovers that 
he has opened a real can of worms 
and that some of the goodies he has 
imparted to his attorney may come 
to light, he can protect himself by 
simply dismissing the petition. 123 
Cal.App.3d at 616-17. 
D. Laying Foundation to Establish 
Existence of Attorney.client Privilege 
Disputes over the disclosure of infor-
mation, or the production of material 
that may be subject to the attorney-client 
privilege can arise during trial. To make 
a prima facie showing that the attorney-
client privilege is applicable, the party 
asserting the privilege has the burden of 
proof for the foundational requisites. 
Thus, the party claiming the privilege 
must establish that (1) the person to 
whom the client made the communica-
tion in dispute was a lawyer authorized 
to practice law in some state or nation (or 
someone the client reasonably assumed 
to be authorized to practice law); (2) the 
client consulted the lawyer to obtain le-
gal service or advice; and (3) the specific 
communication in dispute was made in 
the course of that attorney-client rela-
tionship [see Evid. Code §§ 950,952; see 
also Travelers Ins. Companies v. Superior 
Court (1983) 143 Cal. App. 3d 436,447-
448,191 Cal. Rptr. 871. ,In contrast, the 
proponent of the evidence has the bur-
den of proving that the privilege does not 
apply because the communication was 
not made in confidence, was waived, or 
falls under an exception [see above1-
Sometimes, an adequate foundation will 
already have been laid by previous testi-
mony or, as in a case where a questions 
calls for communicaJ;ions with a party's 
attorney of record, matters that may be 
judicially noticed; if not, the foundation 
must be established through the exami-
nation of a witness. 
In many cases, the requisite showing 
may be made by simply asking the attor-
ney or client whether an attorney-client 
relationship existed. Collette v. Sarrasin 
(1920) 184 CaL 283,289,193 P. 571. In 
other cases, it may be necessary to estab-
lish the subject matter of a particular at-
torney-client relationship and when it 
came into existence. When a communi-
cation was transmitted by or to a third 
person, the party claiming the privilege 
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may also be required to show that the 
third person was acting in a particular 
capacity. D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior 
Court (1964) 60 Cal. 2d 723, 736,739, 36 
Cal. Rptr. 468, 388 F.2d 700 (existence of 
privilege dependent upon whether em-
ployee transmitting report wa& acting as 
corporate spokesperson). 
A party asserting a claim of attorney-
client privilege does not waive the privi-
lege by disclosing the existence or subject 
matter of an attorney-client relationship, 
the dates on which attorney-client com-
munications occurred, or even the gen-
eral subject matter of the communica-
tions. Mitchell v. Superior Court (1984) 37 
Cal. 3d 591, 601,603, 208 Cal. Rptr. 886, 
691 P,2d 642; see also Coy v, Superior 
Court (1962) 58 Cal. 2d 210, 219, 220, 23 
Cal Rptr, 393,373 P.2d 457. However, a 
disclosure of any significant part of the 
content of the communication may result 
in a waiver. fulrik Productions, Inc. v. 
Chester (1974) 38 Cal. App. 3d 807, 811, 
113 Cal. Rptr. 527. 
E. Reciprocal Discovery and the Effects 
or Proposition 115 on the Attomey· 
Client Privilege 
1. Statutory Authority 
Proposition 115, passed in June, 1990, 
amended the California Constitution by 
permitting reciprocal discovery in crimi-
nal cases. Furthermore, Proposition 115 
added Chapter 10 to the California Penal 
Code. This Chapter (listed below) enu-
merates the specific items of evidence 
that the prosecution and defense must 
make available upon request. 
Penal Code section 1054.1. Prosecuting 
attorney; disclosure of materials to the 
defendant 
The prosecuting attorney shall dis-
close to the defendant or his or her attor-
ney all of the following materials and 
information, if it is in the possession of 
the prosecuting attorney or if the pros-
ecuting attorney knows it to be in the 
possession of the investigating agencies: 
(a) The names and addresses of per-
sons the prosecutor intends to call as wit-
nesses at triaL 
(b) Statements of all defendants. 
(c) All relevant real evidence seized or 
obtained as a part of the investigation of 
the offenses charged, 
(d) The existence of a felony convic-
tion of any material witness whose cred-
ibility is likely to be critical to the out-
come of the trial. 
(e) Any exculpatory evidence. 
(0 Relevant written or recorded state-
ments of witnesses or reports of the state-
ments of witnesses whom the prosecutor 
intends to call at the trial, including any 
reports or statements of experts made in 
conjunction with the case, including the 
results of physical or mental examina-
tions, scientific tests, experiments, or 
comparisons which the prosecutor in-
tends to offer in evidence at the trial. 
Penal Code section 1054.2. Disclosure 
of address or telephone number of 
victim or witness; prohibition; 
exception 
No attorney may disclose or permit to 
be disclosed to a defendant the address 
or telephone number of a victim or wit-
ness whose name is disclosed to the at-
torney pursuant to subdivision (a) of Sec-
tion 1054.1 unless specifically permitted 
to do so by the court after a hearing and 
a showing of good cause. 
Penal Code section 1054.3. Defense 
counsel; disclosure of information to 
prosecution 
The defendant and his or her attorney 
shall disclose to the prosecuting attorney: 
(a) The names and addresses of per-
sons, other than the defendant, he or she 
intends to call as witnesses at trial, to-
gether with any relevant written or re-
corded statements of those persons, or 
reports of the experts made in connection 
with the case, and including the results of 
physical or mental examinations, scien-
tific tests, experiments, or comparisons 
which the defendant intends to offer in 
evidence at the trial. 
(b) Any real evidence which the de-
fendant intends to offer in evidence at the 
trial. 
Penal Code section 1054.4. 
Nontestimonial evidence 
Nothing in this chapter shall be con-
strued as limiting any law enforcement 
or prosecuting agency from obtaining 
non testimonial evidence to the extent 
permitted by law on the effective date of 
this section. 
Penal Code section 1054.5. Criminal 
cases; discovery orders; informal 
request; testimony of witnesses; 
prohibition 
(a) No order requiring discovery shall 
be made in criminal cases except as pro-
vided in this chapter. This chapter shall 
be the only means by which the defen-
dant may compel the disclosure or pro-
duction of information from prosecuting 
attorneys, law enforcement agencies 
which investigated or prepared the case 
against the defendant, or any other per-
sons or agencies which the prosecuting 
attorney or investigating agency may 
have employed to assist them in per-
forming their duties. 
(b) Before a party may seek court en-
forcement of any of the disclosures re-
quired by this chapter, the party shall 
make an informal request of opposing 
counsel for the desired materials and in-
formation. If within 15 days the oppos-
ing counsel fails to provide the materials 
and information requested, the party 
may seek a court order. Upon a showing 
that a party has not complied with Sec-
tion 1054.1 or 1054.3 and upon a shmving 
that the moving party complied with the 
informal discovery procedure provided 
in this subdivision, a court may make 
any order necessary to enforce the provi-
sions of this chapter, including, but not 
limited to, immediate disclosure, con-
tempt proceedings, delaying or prohibit-
ing the testimony of a witness or the pre-
sentation of real evidence, continuance of 
the matter, or any other lawful order. 
Further, the court may advise the jury of 
any failure or refusal to disclose and of 
any untimely disclosure. 
(c) The court may prohibit the testi-
mony of a witness pursuant to subdivi-
sion (b) only if all other sanctions have 
been exhausted. The court shall not dis-
miss a charge pursuant to subdivision (b) 
unless required to do so by theConstitu-
tion of the United States. 
Penal Code section 1054.6. Work 
product privilege 
Neither the defendant nor the pros-
ecuting attorney is required to disclose 
any materials or information which are 
work product as defined in subdivision 
(c) of Section 2018 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, or which are privileged pur-
suant to an express statutory provision, 
or are privileged as provided by the Con-
stitution of the United States. 
'*NOTE: This section and its relation 
to work product are dealt with more ex-
tensively below. 
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Penal Code section 1054.7. Disclosure 
of information; time limitations 
The disclosures required under this 
chapter shall be made at least 30 days 
prior to the tria\' unless good cause is 
shown why a disclosure should be de-
nied, restricted or deferred. If the mate-
rial and information becomes known to, 
or comes into the possession of, a party 
within 30 days of trial, disclosure shall be 
made immediately, unless good cause is 
shown why a disclosure should be de-
nied, restricted or deferred. "Good 
cause" is limited to threats or possible 
danger to the safety of a victim or wit-
ness, possible loss or destruction of evi-
dence, or possible compromise of other 
investigations by law enforcement. 
Upon the request of any party, the 
court may permit a showing of good 
cause for the denial or regulation of dis-
closures, or any portion of that showing, 
to be made in camera. A verbatim 
records shall be made of any such pro-
ceeding. If the court enters an order 
granting relief following a showing in 
camera, the entire record of the showing 
shall be sealed and preserved in the 
records of the court, and shall be made 
available to an appellate court in the 
event of an appeal or writ. In its discre-
tion, the trial court may after trial and 
conviction, unseal any previously sealed 
matter. 
2. Validity 
In lzazaga v. Superior Court, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court affirmed the con-
stitutionality of the above sections, hold-
ing that Penal Code section 1054 et seq., 
does not compel a criminal defendant to 
be a witness against oneself in violation 
of the Fifth Amendmentto the Constitu-
tion. In this case the defendant was 
charged with rape and kidnapping. The 
prosecutor moved for discovery of the 
defense witnesses and the trial court 
granted the motion. The defense filed a 
writ of mandate or Prohibition that the 
court of appeals summarily denied. The 
California Supreme Court upheld the 
denial of the writ by the court of appeals 
and concluded that the discovery provi-
sions of Proposition 115 are valid under 
the state and federal constitutions. The 
Court further held that Penal Code sec-
tion 1054 et seq. affords defendants suffi-
cient rights of reciprocal discovery to 
meet the requirements of the 14th 
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Amendment Due Process Clause as it 
provides that the defendant will have the 
opportunity to discover the prosecutor's 
rebuttal witnesses (and their statements) 
following discovery of defense witnesses 
by the prosecutor. 
The Izazaga court rejected the defense 
challenge that the discovery provision 
violates the 6th Amendment right to 
counsel by chilling the defense counsel's 
preparation: 
... Under the new discovery chapter, 
a criminal defendant need disclose 
only those witnesses (and their 
statements) the defendant intends 
to call a t trial. It is logical to assume 
that only those witnesses defense 
counsel deems helpful to the de-
fense will appear on a defendant's 
witness list. The identity of damag-
ing witnesses that the defense does 
not intend to call at trial need not be 
disclosed. 54 CaL3d at 379. 
3. Scope of disclosure 
Hobbs v. Municipal Court (1991) 233 
Cal.App.3d 670, 284 CaLRptr. 655, de-
cided the same year as [zazaga, also up-
held the constitutionality of the discov-
ery provisions of Proposition 115. 
Hobbs, charged in a felony complaint 
with residential burglary, had his charge 
reduced to a misdemeanor at the conclu-
sion of the preliminary hearing. He at-
tacked the constitutionality of the discov-
ery provisions of Proposition 115, and 
also argued that the discovery provisions 
of Proposition 115violatethework prod-
uct doctrine. In striking down these ar-
guments, as well as the one the Proposi-
tion 115 should not apply in misde-
meanor cases, the court stated: 
The language of Proposition 115 makes 
no distinction between felony and misdl .... 
meanor cases. Rather, it repeatedly refers 
to the "criminal justice system," and 
"criminal cases". The Penal Code includes 
misdemeanors as well as felonies in its 
definitions of crimes ... We also find signifi-
cant the fact that in the are of discovery, 
PropOSition 115 repealed both the misde-
meanor statute and part of the felony stat-
ute that required discovery of police re-
ports. Thus, where there were specific 
discovery statutes concerning felonies and 
misdemeanors, the initiative dealt with 
both categories of crime. We conclude this 
is strong evidence of legislative intent to 
include misdemeanors as well as felonies 
within the discovery provisions of the 
measure. 233 Cal.App.3d at 696. 
Rodriguez v. Superior Court (1993) 14 
CaLApp.4th 1260, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 120, 
held that, in a prosecution for rape, rob-
bery, burglary, and first degree murder, 
defend.mt's statement to a psychologist, 
made at his counsel' 5 behest for purposes 
of evaluation in preparation of the de-
fense case, came within Evidence Code 
section 952, a privileged communication 
under the attorney-client privilege. The 
court further held that under Penal Code 
section 1054.6, information within the 
statutory attorney-client privilege is not 
subject to disclosure at the time a witness 
is designated pursuant to Penal Code 
section 1054.3: 
We conclude that the privilege pro-
vision of section 1054.6 is meant to 
modify and affect the blanket disclo-
sure provisions of section 1054.3. 
Accordingly, we interpret section 
1054.3 as requiring disclosure of in-
formation when the witness is des-
ignated unless that information is 
privileged by "express statutory 
provision" or otherwise protected 
as work product. Such an interpre-
tation construes each statutory pro-
vision (1054.3 and 1054.6) in light of 
the other, is an harmonious inter-
pretation, is reciprocal in effect, and 
does not render section 1054.6 a nul-
lity. 14 Cal.App.4th at 1269. 
Therefore, even though the psycholo-
gist was designated as a defense witness, 
the defense did not have to disclose prior 
to trial the psychologist's report of 
defendant's remarks concerning the 
charged offenses. The court also held 
that the partial disclosure to the prosecu-
tion before trial of defendant's psycho-
logical report did not waive the attorney-
client privilege with respect to a deleted 
section of the report. [This section con-
tained defendant's remarks to the psy-
chologist concerning the charged of-
fenses.] The court reasoned that since the 
disclosure was done pursuant to a court 
order and was not voluntary, the waiver 
of the privilege as to one aspect of a pro-
tected relationship does not necessarily 
waive the privilege as to other aspects of 
the privileged relationship. The court 
cited the defense's good faith efforts to 
comply with the court's order and coop-
erate with the prosecutor without waiv-
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ing any privilege regarding defendant's 
statements about the alleged offense. 
Citing the Rodriguez opinion, the 
court in Sandeffer v. Superior Court (1993) 
18 CaLApp.4th 672, 22 CaLRptr.2d 261, 
held that the trial court exceeded its juris-
diction under Penal Code section 1054.5, 
subd. (b) (court may make any order nec-
essary to enforce discovery provisions), 
by directing defense counsel to disclose 
the identity of the expert and produce the 
expert's documents despite defense 
counsel's representations that he had not 
yet made a decision as to whether to call 
the expert as a witness at triaL The deter-
mination of whether to call a witness, the 
court held, is peculiarly within the dis-
cretion of counsel, and even when coun-
sel appears to be unreasonably delaying 
the publication of the decision to call a 
witness, it is not within the province of 
the trial judge to step into counsel's 
shoes. The court further held that an or-
der requiring an expert witness in a 
criminal case to produce his or her 
"notes" in most instances goes beyond 
the specification of discoverable items set 
forth in Penal Code section 1054, 
subd.(e). This section provides that dis-
covery of information pertaining to ex-
pert witnesses shall include any reports 
or statements of the expert made in con-
nection with the case, as well as the re-
sults of physical or mental examination, 
scientific tests, experiments, or compari-
sons which the defendant intends to offer 
in evidence at triaL 
In Peopie v. Superior Court (Sturm) 
(1992) 9 CaLApp.4th 172, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 
652, the court held that Penal Code sec-
tion 1054.3, subd.(a) [requiring the de-
fense to disclose to the prosecution the 
witnesses it intends to call "at trial,"1 in-
cludes those witnesses the defense in-
tends to call during the penalty phase of 
a capital triaL The court held that Penal 
Code section 190.3, [which requires ex-
clusion of aggravating evidence prof-
fered by the prosecution in the penalty 
phase of a homicide prosecution unless 
the defense has been given notice of itl, 
does not control penalty phase discovery 
procedures so as to preempt the recipro-
cal discovery provisions of Penal code 
section 1054 et seq. The court further 
held that to interpret the reciprocal dis-
covery provisions to require the disclo-
sure of defense witnesses to be called in 
the penalty phase does not violate the 
due process rights of capital defendants 
or deny them equal protection. 
Regarding the juvenile court context, 
the court in Robert S. v. Superior Court of 
Sonoma County (1992) 9 CaLAppAth 
1417,12 Cal.Rptr.2d 489, held that recip-
rocal discovery provisions applicable in 
criminal procE'pdings did not apply in 
juvenile delinquency proceedings, but 
that the juvenile court had discretionary 
authority to enter reciprocal discovery 
order. 
In the more recent case of People v. 
Sanchez (1994) W.L. 157932 (CaLApp. 2 
Dist.), the court held that once some in-
criminating writings had been delivered 
to the trial court, the trial court could 
furnish those writings to the prosecutor 
without violating either the defendant's 
privilege against self-incrimination or 
the reciprocal discovery statutes (Penal 
Code sections 1054-1054.7). In this case, 
the Public Defender representing 
Sanchez, who was charged with murder, 
was given some inculpatory writings 
done by the defendant. The writings 
were not given to the lawyer by the de-
fendant, but by a third party. The Public 
Defender placed the writings in a sealed 
envelope, and without informing the 
prosecutor, delivered them to the clerk of 
the court. (Although counsel never did 
explain why he turned these papers over 
to the court, the court surmised that he 
may have felt some professional obliga-
tion to do so). The court specifically did 
not hold that counsel had a duty to tum 
over such writings, but limited its hold-
ings to the actions of the court once the 
writings were disclosed. 
F. Ethical Considerations Regarding 
Attorney-Client Privilege and the 
Confidentiality of Information 
1. Statutory Authority 
All persons licensed to practice law in 
California are bound by the statutes com-
prising the State Bar Act (Business and 
Professions Code sections 6000-6228) 
and the Rules of Professional Conduct 
(Rules 1-100 - 5-320). An attorney who 
willfully breaches any of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct can be disciplined 
by public or private reproval, or by sus-
pension from practice (Bus. & Prof. Code 
sec. 6077). Similarly, an attorney can be 
disbarred or suspended for any of the 
following: 
(1) Willful disobedience or viola-
tion of a court order which the 
attorney ought in good faith to 
obey; 
(2) Violation of the oath taken by 
the attorney to defend the 
Const. and the la ws of the state 
and nation; or 
(3) Violation of the duties of an 
attorney.(Bus. & Prof. Code sec. 
6103) 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF 
THE STATE BAR OF CAUFORNIA 
Rule 1-100 - Rules of protosslonal 
Conduct, in General. 
(A) Purpose and Function 
The following rules are intended to 
regulate professional conduct of mem-
bers of the State Bar through discipline. 
They have been adopted by the Board of 
governors of the State Bar of California 
and approved by the Supreme Court of 
California pursuant to Business and Pro-
fessions code sections 6076 and 6077 to 
protect the public and to promote respect 
and confidence in the legal profession. 
These rules together with any standards 
adopted by the Board of Governors pur-
suant to these rules shall be binding upon 
all members of the State Bar. 
For a willful breach of any of these 
rules, the Board of Governors has the 
power to discipline members as pro-
vided by law. 
The prohibition of certain conduct in 
these rules is not exclusive. Members are 
also bound by applicable law induding 
the State Bar Act. (bus. & Prof. Code, sec-
tion 6000 et seq.) and opinions of Califor-
nia Courts. Although not binding, opin-
ions of ethics committees in California 
should be consulted by members for 
guidance on proper professional con-
duct. Ethics opinions and rules and stan-
dards promulgated by other jurisdic-
tions and bar associations may also be 
considered. 
These rules are not intended to create 
new civil causes of action. Nothing in 
these rules shall be deemed to create, 
augment, diminish, or eliminate any sub-
stantive legal duty of lavvyers or the non-
disciplinary consequences of violating 
such a duty. 
(B) Definitions. 
(1) "Law Firm" means: 
(a) two or more lawyers whose ac-
tivities constitute the practice of 
2nd & 3rd Quarters, 1994 
t 
CALIFORNiA D E F F N D E _R __________ _ 
----~-~ .. ---.~ 
law, and who share its profits, 
expenses, and liabilities; or 
(b)a law corporation which em-
ployees more than one lawyer; 
or 
(d a division, department, office, 
or group within a business en-
tity, which includes more than 
one lawyer who performs legal 
services for the business entity; 
or 
(d)a publicly funded entity which 
employs more than one lawyer 
to perform legal services. 
(2) "Member" means a member of the 
State Bar of California. 
(3) "Lawyer" means a member of the 
State Bar of California or a person 
who is admitted in good standing 
of and eligible to practice before 
the bar of any U.S. court or the 
highest court of the District of Co-
lumbia or any state, territory, or 
insular possession of the United 
States, or is licensed to practice law 
in, or is admitted in good standing 
and eligible to practice before the 
bar of the highest court of, a for-
eign country or any political sub-
division thereof. 
(4) U Associate" means an employee 
or fellow employee who is em-
ployed as a lawyer. 
(5) "Shareholder" means a share-
holder in a professional corpora-
tion pursuant to Business and Pro-
fessions Code section 6160 et seq. 
(C) Purpose of Discussions. 
Because it is a practical impossibility 
to convey in black letter form all of the 
nuances of these disciplinary rules, the 
comments contained in the Discussions 
of the rules, while they do not add inde-
pendent basis for imposing discipline, 
are intended to provide guidance for in-
terpreting the rules and practicing in 
compliance with them. 
(D) Geographic Scope of Rules. 
(1) As to members: 
These rules shall govern the activi-
ties of members in and outside this 
state, except as members lawfully 
practicing outside this state may 
be specifically required by a juris-
diction in which they are practic-
ing to follow rules of professional 
conduct different from these rules. 
(2) As to lav..)'ers from other jurisdic-
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Hons who are not members: 
These rules shall also govern the 
activities of lawyers while en-
gaged in the performance of law-
yer functions in this state; but 
nothing contained in these rules 
shall be deemed to authorize the 
performance of such functions by 
such persons in this state except as 
otherwise permitted by law. 
(E) These rules may be cited and 
referred to as "Rules of Professional 
Conduct of the State Bar of California. 
Rule 1-110. Disciplinary Authority of the 
SiateBar. 
A member shall comply with condi-
tions attached to public or private 
reprovals or other discipline adminis-
tered by the State Bar pursuant to Busi-
ness and Professions Code sections 6077 
and 6078 and rule 956, California Rules of 
Court. 
Business and Professions Code 
section 6068. Duties of attorney. 
It is the duty of an attorney to do all of 
the following: 
(a) To support the Constitution and 
laws of the United States and of 
this state. 
(b) To maintain the respect due to the 
courts of justice and judicial offic-
ers. 
(c) To counselor maintain such ac-
tions, proceedings, or defenses 
only as appear to him or her legal 
or just, except the defense of a per-
son charged with a public offense. 
(d)To employ, for the purpose of 
maintaining the causes confided to 
him or her such means only as are 
consistent with truth, and never to 
seek to mislead the judge or any 
judicial officer by an artifice or 
false statement of fact or law. 
(e) To maintain inviolate the confi-
dence, and at every peril to himself 
or herself to preserve the secrets, of 
his or her client. 
(f) To abstain from all offensive per-
sonality, and to advance no fact 
prejudicial to the honor or reputa-
tion of a party or witness, unless 
required by the justice of the cause 
with which he or she is charged. 
(g) Not to encourage either the com-
mencement or the continuance of an 
action or proceeding from any cor-
rupt motive of passion or interest. 
(h) Never to reject, for any consider-
ation personal to himself or her-
self, the cause of the defenseless or 
the oppressed. 
(i) To cooperate and participate in 
any diSciplinary investigation or 
other regulatory or diSciplinary 
proceeding pending against the at-
torney. However, this subdivision 
shall not be construed to deprive 
an attorney of any privilege guar-
anteed by the Fifth Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United 
States or any other constitutional 
or statutory privileges. 
(j) To comply with the requirements 
of Section 6002.1. (Official mem-
bership records; maintenance of 
information; service of notice initi-
ating proceedings; availability of 
information on records; form for 
reports) 
(k)To comply with all conditions at-
tached to any disciplinary proba-
tion, including a probation im-
posed with the concurrence of the 
attorney. 
(I) To keep all agreements made in 
lieu of disciplinary prosecution 
with the agency charged with at-
torney discipline. 
(m) To respond promptly to reason-
able status inquiries of clients and 
to keep clients reasonable in-
formed of significant develop-
ments in matters with regard to 
which the attorney has agreed to 
provide legal services. 
The attorney also has a duty to pro-
vide copies to the client of certain docu-
ments under time limits and as pre-
scribed by the Rules of Professional Con-
duct (Bus. & Prof. Code section 6068(n». 
Under specified conditions, such as the 
bringing of an indictment charging a 
15 
16 
CAL I R N I A DEFENDER 
felony against the attorney, the attorney 
must make written reports to the State 
Bar (Bus. & Prof. Code section 6068(0». 
2. Professional Relationship with 
Clients 
a. Scope of Representation 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF 
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA 
Rule 3-110: Failing to Act Competently 
(A) A member shall not intentionally, 
recklessly, or repeatedly fail to 
perform legal services with compe-
tence. 
(B) For purposes of this rule, "compe-
tence" in any legal service shall mean 
to apply to the 1) diligence, 2) learning 
and skill, and 3) mental, emotional, 
and physical ability reasonably 
necessary for the performance of such 
service. 
(C) If a member does not have 
sufficient learning and skill when the 
legal service is undertaken, the 
member may nonetheless perform 
such services competently by 1) 
associating with or, where appropri-
ate, professionally consulting another 
lawyer reasonably believed to be 
competent, or 2) by acquiring suffi-
cient learning and skill before 
performance is required. 
Rule 3-210: Advising the Violation of Law 
A member shall not advise the viola-
tion of any law, rule, or ruling of a tribu-
nal unless the member believes in good 
faith that such law, rule, or ruling is in-
valid. A member may take appropriate 
steps in good faith to test the validity of 
any law, rule, or ruling of a tribunal. 
Rule 3-210 is intended to apply not 
only to the prospective conduct of a cli-
ent but also to the interaction between 
the member and client and to the specific 
legal service sought by the client from the 
member. An example of the former is the 
handling of phYSical evidence of a crime 
in the possession of the client and offered 
to the member. (See People v. Meredith 
(1981) 29 Cal.3d 682, 175 CaLRptr. 612). 
An example of the latter is a request that 
the member negotiate the return of stolen 
property in exchange for the owner's 
agreement not to report the theft to the 
police or prosecutorial authorities. (See 
People v. Pic'/ (1982) 31 Ca1.3d 731, 183 
Cal.Rptr. 685). 
A.B.A. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT 
Rule :1..2 Seope of Repre_ntatlon 
(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client's 
decisions concerning the objec-
tives of representation, subject to 
paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), and 
shall consult with the client as to 
the means by which they are to be 
pursued. A lawyer shall abide by 
a client's decision whether to ac-
cept an offer of settlement of a 
maUer. In a criminal case, the law-
yer shall abide by the client deci-
sion, after consultation with the 
lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, 
whether to waive jury trial and 
whether the client will testify. 
(b) A lawyer's representation of a cli-
ent, including representation by 
appointment, does not constitute 
an endorsement of the client's po-
litical, economic, social or moral 
views or activities. 
(c) A lawyer may limit the objectives 
of the representation if the client 
consents after consultation. 
(d) A la'WY~r shall not counsel a c1i~I}t 
to engage: or assist a client. in con-
duct that thgJawyer knows is 
criminal or fraudulent, but a law-
y~LIl}(ly discuss the legal conse-
quences of any proposed course of 
conduct with a!;!ient and may 
counselor assist a client to make a 
good faith ~ffort to determine the 
validity, scope, meaning or appli-
cation of the law. 
(e) When a lawyer knows that a client 
expects assistance not permitted 
by the rules of professional con-
duct or other law, the lawyer shall 
consult with the client rC'garding 
the relevant limitations on the 
lawyer's conduct. 
COMPARISON· A.B.A. MODEL CODE OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Disciplinary Rule 7-102: Repf9lll8ntlng a 
Client Within the Bounds of the Law 
(A) In his representation of a client, a 
lawyer shall not: 
(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a 
defense, delay a trial, or take other 
action on behalf of his client when he 
knows or when it is obvious that such 
action would serve merely to harass 
or maliciously injure another. 
(2) KnOWingly advance a claim or de-
fense that is unwarranted under exist-
ing law. except that he may advance 
such claim or defense if it can be sup-
ported by good faith argument for an 
extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law. 
(3) Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose 
that which he is required by law to 
reveal. 
(4) Knowingly use perjured testimony or 
false evidence. 
(5) KnOWingly make a false statement of 
law or fact. 
(6) Participate in the creation or preser-
vation of evidence when he knows or 
it is obvious that the evidence is false. 
(7) Counselor assist his client in conduct 
that the la'WYer knows to be illegal or 
fraud ulent. 
(8) Knowingly engage in other illegal 
~onduct or coI\<:llJd contrary to a Dis-
Ciplinary Rule. 
(B) A lawyer who receives Infonnation 
clearly establishing that: 
(1 ) Hisc::lient has, in the course of the rep: 
resentation, perpetrated a fraud upon 
a person or tribunal shall promptly 
call upon his client to rectify the same, 
iln if his client refuses OIis unable t9 
go so, he shall reveal the fraud to the 
ilffected person or tribunaL except 
when the information is protected as 
a privileged <;Qmmunication. 
(2) a person other than his client has per-
petrated a fraud upon a tribunal shall 
promptly reveal the fraud to the tribu-
nal. 
*NOTE:Qisct.p.linary Power: The 
Model Code makes no attempt to pre-
scribe either the disciplinary procedures 
or penalties for violation of a Disciplin-
ary Rule, nor does it undertake to define 
standards for civil liability of lawyers for 
professional conduct. The Model Code 
seeks only to specify conduct for which a 
lawyer should be disciplined by courts 
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and governmental agencies which have 
adopted it. 
b. Confidentiality of Information 
See Business and Professions Code 
section 6068(e). 
A.B.A. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT 
Rule 1.6 Conftdentlallty of Information 
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information 
relating to representation of a client 
unless the client consents after consul-
tation, except for disclosures that are 
impliedly authorized in order to carry 
out the representation, and except as 
stated in paragraph (b). 
(b) A lawyer may reveal such informa-
tion to the extent the lawyer reason-
ably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent the client from commit-
ting a criminal act that the lawyer 
believes is likely to result in immi-
nent death or substantial bodily 
harm; or 
(2) to establish a claim or defense on 
behalf of the lawyer in a contro-
versy between the lawyer and the 
client, to establish a defense to a 
criminal charge or a civil claim 
against the lawyer based upon 
conduct in which the client was in-
volved, or to respond to allega-
tions in any proceeding concern-
ing the lawyer's representation of 
the client. 
Rule 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(1) make a false statement of material 
fact or law to a tribunal; 
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a 
tribunal when disclosure is neces-
sary to avoid assisting a criminal 
or fraudulent act by the client; 
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal 
authOrity in the controlling juriS-
diction known to the lawyer to be 
directly adverse to the position of 
the client and not disclosed by op-
posing counsel; or 
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer 
knows to be false. If a lawyer has 
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offered material evidence and 
comes to know of its falsity, the 
la wyer shall take reasonable reme-
dial measures. 
(blThe duties stated in paragraph (a) 
continup to the conclusion of the pro-
ceeding, and apply even if compli-
ance requires disclosure of informa-
tion otherwise protected by Rule 1.6. 
(c) A la wyer may refuse to offer evidence 
that the lawyer reasonably believes is 
false. 
(d)In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer 
shall inform the tribunal of all mate-
rial facts known to the lawyer which 
will enable the tribunal to make an in-
formed decision, whether or not the 
facts are adverse. 
A.B.A. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Disciplinary Rule 4-101 Preservation of 
Confidences and Secrets of a Client 
(A) "Confidence" refers to informa-
tion protected by the attorney-client 
privilege under appHcable law, and 
"secret" refers to other information 
gained in the professional relation-
ship that the client has requested be 
held inviolate or the disclosure of 
which would be embarrassing or 
would be likely to be detrimental to 
the client. 
(B) Except when permitted under DR 
4-101(0, a lawyer shall not know-
ingly: 
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his 
client. 
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his 
client to the disadvantage of the 
client. 
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his 
client for the advantage of himself 
or of a third person, unless the cli-
ent consents after full disclosure. 
(C) A lawyer may reveal: 
(1) Confidences or secrets with the 
consent of the client or clients af-
fected, but only after a full disclo-
sure to them. 
(2) Confidences or secrets when per-
mitted under Disciplinary Rules or 
required by law or court order. 
(3) The intention of his client to com-
mit a crime and the information 
necessary to prevent the crime. 
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary 
to establish or collect his fee or to 
defend himself or his employees 
or associations against an accusa-
tion of wrongful conduct. 
(D) A lawyer shall exercise reasonable 
care to prevent his employees, 
associates, and others whose services 
are utilized by him from disclosing or 
using confidences or secrets of a 
client, except that a lawyer may reveal 
information allowed by DR 4-101 (C) 
through an employee. 
The California Rules of Professional 
Conduct, based in part on the old A.B.A. 
Model Code, are unaffected by the new 
A.B.A. Model Rules, and there are no 
current plans for adoption of the Model 
Rules in this state. It is likely, however, 
that California courts and lawyers will 
find the Model Rules both helpful and 
persuasive in situations where the cover-
age of the California Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct is unclear or inadequate. 
The Comment to the A.B.A. Model 
Rule 1.6 states that a lawyer may foresee 
that the client intends serious harm to 
another, but if disclosure is required or 
permitted the client will be inhibited 
from revealing facts which would enable 
the lawyer to counsel against wrongful 
action. If further goes on to advise that 
where practical, the lawyer should seek 
to persuade the client to take suitable 
action; and in any case disclosure should 
be no greater than the lawyer reasonably 
believes necessary. 
The Comment also distinguishes sev-
eral situations: (1) A lawyer may not 
counselor assist in conduct that is crimi-
nal or fraudulent, or use false evidence; 
(2) A lawyer innocently involved in past 
criminal or fraudulent conduct has not 
violated Rule 1.2(d) (above); i.e., "coun-
sel or assist" requires knowledge of the 
criminal or fraudulent character; (3) A 
lawyer who learns that a client intends 
prospective criminal conduct likely to 
result in imminent death or substantial 
bodily harm has discretion to reveal the 
information when he reasonably be-
lieves that this purpose will be carried 
out. 
3. Client's Intention to Commit a Future 
Crime 
Any communication made by the de-
fendant to his or her attorney of an inten-
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tion to commit a crime is not privileged 
under California law. (Evidence Code 
section 956.5) Under the American Bar 
Association's Professional Responsibil-
ity Code and Model Rules, such a com-
munication may and perhaps should be 
rpvpa1pd hy the attorney, as wpll as any 
information necessary to prevent the 
crime. (See AB.A. Model rules ofProfes-
sional Conduct, Rules 1.6(b)(1) [above], 
3.3(a)(2); A.B.A. Code of Professional 
Responsibility, DR 4-101(C)(3) [above]) 
Thus, the California Supreme Court has 
approved of a defense attorney s request 
to speak to the trial judge in camera, and 
informing the judge that the defendant 
may attempt to escape and that it might 
be wise to order the defendant hand-
cuffed during the trial. (People v. Cox 
(1991) 53 Cal. 3d 618,651-52, 280Cal.Rptr. 
692,809 P.2d 351lattorney' s revealing of 
rumor, although permitted and perhaps 
obligated, was insufficient to constitute 
manifest need, thus shackling and hand-
cuffing should not have been ordered 
without a greater showing]) 
Nothing in the California Codes 
places an affirmative duty upon the at-
torney to reveal his client's intention to 
commit a crime. (See B.4., above) 
II. AnORNEY'S WORK PRODUCT 
PROTECTION 
A. StatutOlY Authority 
1. Penal Code section 1054.6 provides: 
Neither the defendant nor the pros-
ecuting attorney is required to dis-
close any materials or information 
which are work product as defined in 
subsection (c) of Section 2018 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure, or which are 
privileged pursuant to an express 
statutory provision, or are privileged 
as provided by the Constitution of the 
United States. 
2. California Code of Civil Procedure 
section 2018 provides in pertinent 
part: 
(a) It is the policy of the state to: (1) 
preserve the rights of attorneys to 
prepare cases for trial with tha t de-
gree of privacy necessary to en-
courage them to prepare their 
cases thoroughly and to investi-
gate not only the favorable but the 
unfavorable aspects of those cases; 
and (2) to prevent attorneys from 
taking undue advantage of their 
adversary's industry and efforts. 
(c) Any writing tha t reflects an 
attorney's impressions, conclu-
sions, opinions, or legal research 
or theories shall not be discover-
able under any circumstances. 
B. Work Product Protection-General 
A claim of work product operates like 
a privilege to prevent disclosure of par-
ticular information. Under most circum-
stances, it protects the private work of an 
attorney from discovery. It is defined in 
the Cal. Code Civil Procedure, section 
2018(c) as any writing that reflects an 
attorney's impressions, conclusions, 
opinions, legal research or theories. 
However, without any more guidance as 
to the meaning of "work product" mate-
rial, a determination must be made by 
the court on a case by case basis as to 
whether a writing falls within its protec-
tion. 
The United States Supreme Court in 
Hickman v. Taylor, (1947) 329 U.s. 495, 91 
L.ed. 451, 67 S. Ct. 385, stated: 
Proper preparation of a client's case 
demands that he assemble information, 
sift what he considers to be the relevant 
from the irrelevant facts, prepare his le-
gal theories and plan his strategy with-
out undue and needless interference. 
That is the historical and the necessary 
way in which lawyers act within the 
framework of our system of jurispru-
dence to promote justice and to protect 
their client's interests. This work is re-
flected, of course, in interviews, state-
ments, memoranda, correspondence, 
briefs, mental impressions, personal be-
liefs, and countless other tangible and 
intangible ways- aptly though roughly 
termed by the Circuit Court of Appeals 
in this case as the 'work product of the 
lawyer. 329 U.5. at 511. 
In California, courts have identified 
attorney work product "as material 
which is derivative in character, not ulti-
mate facts but material compiled by the 
attorney in preparation of his or her 
case". In re Jeanette H. (1990) 225 Cal. 
App.3d 25, 32, 275 Cal. Rptr. 9. 
C. Adoption of Work Product Rule In 
California 
California was slow to adopt the prin-
ciples of the work product rule. In an 
early case, the California Supreme Court 
held that the work product rule was not 
applicable in California. Greyhound Corp. 
v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal. 2d 355, 
401,15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 364 P.2d 266. Grey-
hound was a personal injury suit arising 
from a collision with a bus. Plaintiffs' 
counsel was unable to locate witnesses to 
the accident despite diligent efforts and 
sought an order requiring defendant to 
disclose the written statements of wit-
nesses collected at the scene by defen-
dant's investigators. In upholding the 
trial court's discovery order, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that the work 
product privilege was not applicable in 
California and refused to apply the 
Hickman work product rule, stating: 
This is not to say that discovery may 
not be denied, in proper cases, when dis-
closure of the attorney's efforts, opinions, 
conclusions or theories would be against 
public policy ... or would be eminently 
unfair or unjust, or would impose an 
undue burden. 
Even though the doctrine was never 
officially recognized, between the Grey-
hound decision in 1961 and the adoption 
of the Civil Discovery Act in 1963, the 
work product rule became de facto law 
in California. In court cases, the concept 
of work product was recognized, not as 
an absolute bar to discovery, but as one 
circumstance to be considered by a court 
in exercising its discretion to determine 
whether or not discovery was fair and 
equitable under the circumstances. 
D. PROPOSmON 115 
The work product rule was held to 
apply to criminal cases even before the 
passage of Proposition 115 codified the 
protection in the Penal Code. In People v. 
Collie, (1981) 30 Cal. 3d 43, 177 Cal. Rptr. 
458, 634 P.2d 534, the defendant was 
charged with attempted first degree 
murder of his wife and attempted second 
degree murder of his child. During triat 
a defense witness testified that she had 
spoken with a defense investigator prior 
to trial. The prosecution moved for dis-
covery of the notes prepared by the in-
vestigator. Over the defense objection on 
the basis of the work-product doctrine 
and attorney-client privilege, the court 
ordered production of those notes and 
the defendant was convicted. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court reversed the con-
viction on other grounds, but found that 
the trial court violated the work product 
privilege in granting the prosecution's 
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discovery motion. This error was found 
to be harmless. The court discussed the 
applicability of the work product doc-
trine as follows: 
We have never explicitly held the 
work product doctrine applicable to 
criminal cases and neither has the 
Legislature, although it has codified 
the rule as to civil trials. (Code Civ. 
Pro. section 2016(b». There is little 
reason, however, to withhold its 
protection from the criminally ac-
cused. As the United States Su-
preme Court held in "Al-
though the work product doctrine 
most frequently is asserted as a bar 
to discovery in civil litigation, its 
role in assuring proper functioning 
of the criminal justice system is even 
more vital. The interests of society 
and the accused in obtaining a fair 
and accurate resolution of the ques-
tion of guilt or innocence demand 
that adequate safeguards assure the 
thorough preparation and presenta-
tion of each side of the case." 
30 Cal.3d at 59. 
Proposition 115 passed by the voters 
in California in June of 1990 created a 
new" reciprocal discovery" provision for 
criminal cases by the addition of sections 
1054 - 1054.7 to the Penal Code. Penal 
Code section 1054.6 explicitly provides 
for the application of the work product 
doctrine to criminal discovery. This pro-
vision states that neither the defendant 
nor the prosecution can be reqUired to 
disclose any material or information that 
is work product as defined in Code Civ. 
Pro. section 2018(c). This included any 
writings that reflect an attorney's im-
pressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal 
research or theories is provided absolute 
protection. The work product doctrine 
for criminal cases, therefore, does not 
include the conditional protection af-
forded civil litigants under Code Civil 
Pro section 2018(b) that protects any 
product of an attorney unless the protec-
tion will result in an injustice. 
Penal Code section 1054.6 does not 
appear to change the law with respect to 
the absolute protection of the work prod-
uct privilege, but only to codify existing 
law. Therefore, counsel should be able to 
rely upon earlier precedents in determin-
ing the scope and meaning of the doc-
trine. In addition, since the Penal Code 
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specifically cites to the definition of work 
product in the Code of Civil Procedure, 
counsel should examine and cite to the 
vast body of cases in the civil context that 
have attempted to define the meaning of 
"work product". 
However, counsel must examine the 
earlier cases carefully to determine the 
basis for the court finding that material is 
protected as "work product". If the court 
found the writing to fall within the" ab-
solute" work product protection under 
Code Civ. Procedure 2018(c), (absolute 
protection for impressions, opinions, 
etc), then this finding would be relevant 
to a determination in the criminal con-
text. However, if the court found a writ-
ing to be conditionally protected under 
Code Civ. Procedure 2018(b), (qualified 
protection which must be disclosed to 
avoid injustice), than this material would 
not be protected under the criminal code. 
E. The Constitutionality of the Discov-
ery and Work Prodnct doctrine 
Proposition 115 created a new "recip-
rocal discovery" system in criminal pros-
ecutions in California. Penal Code sec-
tion 1054 1054.7. Prior to this provision, 
the work product doctrine had little ap-
plication in criminal prosecutions since 
the prosecution had few rights to discov-
ery of defense materiaL However, with 
the passage of Proposition 115, the work 
product doctrine will be an important 
means by which each party will attempt 
to resist disclosure of material. 
In Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 
Cal. 3d 356,285 Cal. Rptr. 231, 815 P.2d 
304, the California Supreme Court found 
these discovery provisions to be constitu-
tional. In this case the defendant was 
charged with rape and kidnapping. The 
prosecutor moved for discovery of the 
defense witnesses and the trial court 
granted the motion. The defense filed a 
writ of mandate or prohibition that the 
court of appeals summarily denied. The 
California Supreme Court upheld the 
denial by the court of appeals and con-
cluded that the discovery provisions of 
proposition 115 are valid under the state 
and federal constitutions. The court re-
jected the defense challenge that the dis-
covery provision violates the sixth 
amendment right to counsel provision as 
enunciated in Hickman v. Taylor (1947) 
329 U.s. 495. The court reasoned: 
The doctrine developed in Hickman 
and applied in the context of discov-
ery in criminal cases in Nobles, 
supra, 422 U.s. 225, is not based on 
the right to counsel clause; rather it 
is a form of federally created privi-
lege based upon federal supervisory 
policy and federal statute. (Citations 
omitted). There is no privilege for 
attorney work product in the Cali-
fornia Constitution. Because the 
work product doctrine is not consti-
tutionally founded, there is no basis 
for a facial challenge to the constitu-
tionality of the new discovery chap-
ter on work product grounds. 
Moreover, we note the new discovery 
chapter expressly provides that attorney 
work product is nondiscoverable. Be-
cause there is no constitutional basis for 
a work product privilege, any protection 
in California of the work product of an 
attorney must be based on state common 
or statutory law. 54 Cal. 3d at 381. 
F. Attomey.cllent Privilege and Work 
Product distinguished 
California Evidence Code sections 
950-962 govern the privilege between 
lawyer and client. It preserves the confi-
dentiality of communications between 
the lawyer and the client with the pur-
pose of encouraging full disclosure and 
open communications within this rela-
tionship. 
This privilege should be distin-
guished from an attorney's work-prod-
uct rule which protects the "work-prod-
uct" of the attorney from discovery by 
opposing counsel. This protection is 
governed by the Code of Civil Procedure 
section 2018. Under this section any writ-
ing that reflects an attorney's impres-
sions, conclusions, opinions, or legal re-
search or theories is not discoverable 
under any circumstances. Other matters 
that may constitute an attorney's work 
product may be discoverable if the court 
deems that denial of the discovery will 
(1) unfairly prejudice the party seeking 
discovery or (2) result in an injustice. 
Code Civ. Proc. Section 2018(b). 
In many situations the attorney-client 
privilege and the work product rule 
overlap, as for instance, when an investi-
gator for the attorney obtains informa-
tion from the client and transmits a re-
port to the attorney. The two are, how-
ever, separate and distinct and differ in 
several important respect: (1) statutory 
basis, (2) purposes, and (3) holders. 
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In BP Alaska Exploration, Inc. v. Supe-
rior Court (1988) 199 Cal. App. 3d 1240, 
1256,245 Cal. Rptr. 682, quoting United 
States v. American Tel. and Tel. Co. (D.C. 
Cir. 1980) 642 F.2d 1285, 1299, the court 
contrasted the purposes of the attorney-
client privilege and the work product 
rule [ef. Admiral Ins. v. U.S. Dist. Court For 
Dist. Of Ariz. (9thCir. 1989)881 F.2d 1486, 
1494J: 
The attorney-client privilege exists 
to protect confidential communica-
tions, to assure the client that any 
statements [the client} makes in 
seeking legal advice will be kept 
strictly confidential between [the cli-
ent and the client's] attorney; in ef-
fect, to protect the attorney-client 
relationship. By contrast, the work 
product privilege does not exist to 
protect a confidential relationship, 
but rather to promote the ad versary 
system by safeguarding the fruits of 
an attorney's trial preparations from 
the discovery attempts of the oppo-
nent. The purpose ofthe work prod-
uct doctrine is to protect informa-
tion against opposing parties, rather 
than against all others outside a par-
ticular confidential relationship, in 
order to encourage effective trial 
preparation. 
The attorney-client privilege belongs 
to the client and only the client can waive 
the privilege. In contrast, the work prod-
uct protection belongs to the attorney, 
not the client, although a client may be 
able to assert the work product rule in the 
attorney's absence. Lasky, Haas, Cohler & 
Munter v. Superior Court (1985) 172 Cal. 
App. 3d 264, 218 Cal. Rptr. 205; Kerns 
Constr. Co. v. Superior Court (1968) 266 
Cal. App. 2d 405, 411, 72 Cal. Rptr. 74. 
G. Work Product protection applies to an 
attorney's ilnPressions, conclusions, 
opinions, legal research or theories. 
Hobbs v. San Diego Mun. Court (People) 
(1991) 233 Cal. App.3d 670, 284 Cal. Rptr. 
655, involved a misdemeanor prosecu-
tion for burglary. The prosecutor filed a 
notice and motion for discovery of a com-
plete list of defense witnesses. The trial 
court granted the motion and the defense 
filed a writ of mandate Superior court. 
The court denied the writ and held that 
Penal Code section 1054.3 was constitu-
tional as applied to misdemeanors and 
that a witness list is not protected under 
the work product doctrine. The court of 
appeals upheld this ruling and discussed 
the scope of the work product doctrine in 
criminal cases stating: 
[T]c the extent that witnesses' state-
ments and reports of witness inter-
views reflect merely what the wit-
ness said they are not work product 
As the high court said in Nobles 422 
U.s. at p. 238, 'At its core, the work 
product doctrine shields the mental 
processesoftheattorney, providing 
a privileged area within which he 
can analyze and prepare his client's 
case. (citations omitted) To the ex-
tent that a report of a witness inter-
view reflects an attorney's mental 
processes, it is exempted from dis-
covery by section 1054.6 and a party 
can seek a protective order to that 
effect. (see Code Civ. Proc. section 
2031(e) or an in camera review in 
which the privileged material can be 
excised. 233 Cal. App.3d at 693. 
The court then contrasted the applica-
tion of the work product doctrine in 
criminal and civil cases and observed 
that in the criminal context, the Initiative 
limited its scope to provide only an abso-
lute privilege to those writings that re-
flect "an attorney's impressions, opin-
ions, or legal research, or theories". The 
provision did not embrace the broader, 
qualified work product privilege set 
forth in the Code of eiv. Pro. 2018(c). 
In Rumac Inc. v. Bottomly (1983) 143 
Cal. App.3d 810, 192 Cal. Rptr. 104, plain-
tiff landowners subpoenaed certain 
documents that were prepared and in the 
possession of the attorney who had rep-
resented the defendant landowners dur-
ing negotiations. The trial court granted 
the defendant's motion for a protective 
order finding that these documents were 
absolutely protected from discovery as 
they represented the attorney's impres-
sions, conclusions, opinions, etc. The 
court also found that the privilege ap-
plies even where the lawyer is not pre-
paring for trial but acting only as a con-
sultant or a negotiator. The court held: 
Neither the text of the statute nor the 
policy underlying the creation of the ab-
solute privilege warrants a class distinc-
tion between the la .. ;yer-negotiator and 
the lawyer-litigator. There is also no 
valid reason to differentiate between the 
writing reflecting the private thought 
processes of a lawyer acting on behalf of 
a client at the beginning of a business 
deal and the thoughts of a lawyer when 
that business deal goes sour with result-
ant litigation. 143 Cal. App.3d at 812. 
The COllrt went on to reason: 
In light of the legislative effort de-
voted to the statute, it is reasonable 
to believe that had the Legislature 
intended to limit the privilege to liti-
gation only it would have said so. 
The Legislature not only failed to 
provide for any such limitation but 
in section 3 declared its intent that 
the courts were not to be con-
strained in their interpretation of the 
attorney's absolute work product 
privilege. 143 CaL App.3d at 815. 
In Fellows v. Superior Court (1980) 108 
Cal. App. 3d 55, 68, 166 Cal. Rptr.274, the 
defendants in an insurance bad faith case 
sought to discover the entire legal file of 
the attorney who represented the plain-
tiffs in the underlying action. Holding 
the material in the file to be absolutely 
protected from discovery, the court 
stated: 
The language of [the statute] is clear 
and explicit. It offers no opportu-
nity for compromise or variation, 
There is no authorization for the 
court to weigh or balance any com-
peting interests between the party 
seeking disclosure and the party re-
sisting disclosure. Invocation ofthe 
attorney's work product privilege 
with respect to such a document 
precludes discovery since such a 
document "is protected absolutely 
from disclosure by the attorney's 
work product privilege .. .. " [em-
phasis in original; citation omitted} 
In Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. (1978) 87 Cal. App. 3d 626, 646, 648, 
151 Cal. Rptr. 399, the court of appeal 
held that the work product rule pre-
cluded the introduction at trial of the 
portion of the notes of an investigator 
employed by a codefendant's attorney 
that reflect the investigator's ,..fYrr>rn"·nt" 
about a witness's statements. The 
tigator interviewed a witness and 
corded the witness's statements tOj.:;etller 
with the investigator'S comments 
those statements. The witness 
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quently left the jurisdiction, and the 
witness's deposition was read at triaL 
Another codefendant called the investi~ 
gator as a witness and cross-examined 
the investigator on the contents of the 
notes. The appellate court held that the 
portion~ of the lIotes thal recorded the 
witness's statements are nonderivative 
or noninterpretative in nature, and thus 
are not protected by the work product 
rule. The portions of the notes that con-
stitute the investigator's comments 
about the witness' statements are abso-
lutely protected from disclosure as a 
writing that reflects an attorney's (or 
attorney's agent's) impressions, conclu-
sions, opinions, legal research, or legal 
theories. The appellate court held that 
comments of the attorney's investigator, 
which are protected under the attorney-
client privilege, were so intertwined with 
the witness's recorded statements, which 
are unprotected under the attorney-cli-
ent privilege, that all the notes on the 
matter should be protected by the abso-
lute portion of the attorney's work prod-
uct privilege. 
H. Protection for Opinion Work Product 
Applies Onl, to Writings 
The term "writing," as used in Code 
of Civil Procedure section 2018(c), is de-
fined in Evidence Code section 250. The 
term has been broadly defined to include 
most forms of tangible expression, see, 
e.g., People v. Estrada,(1979) 93 Cal. App. 
3d 76, 100, 155 Cal. Rptr. 731 (tape record-
ings); People v. Moran, (] 974) 39 Cal. App. 
3d 398, 408,410, 114 Cal. Rptr. 413, (pho-
nograph records). 
Unlike the federal rule which protects 
an attorney's mental impressions (Fed. 
Rules Civ. Proc., rule 26(b)(3», 
California's absolute protection for opin-
ion work product applies, on its face, 
only to writings that reflect the attorney's 
opinion. In practice, this limitation may 
not be significant. A legal opinion, in-
cluding the attorney's impressions and 
conclusions, formed during the course of 
an attorney-dient relationship is privi-
leged under Evidence Code section 952, 
regardless of whether or not the opinion 
has been communicated to the client. 
Lohman v. Superior Court,(1978) 81 CaL 
App. 3d 90, 99, 146 Cal. Rptr. 171, but see 
Merritt v. Superior Court,(1970) 9 Cal. 
App. 3d 721, 731, 88 Cal. Rptr. 337 (court 
allowed discovery of materials that ap-
pear to constitute opinion work product 
on ground that it was not in writing, and 
held that the attorney-client privilege 
had been waived). 
I. Statements of witnesses are not 
protected as work product 
Under the nc"" Penal Code sections 
1 054 -1054.7 (passed as Proposition 115) 
the new reciprocal discovery provisions 
are set forth. These sections specifically 
provide for the discovery of statements 
of witnesses that one side intends to call 
at trial Since section 1054.6 states thatthe 
work product of counsel is protected, it is 
clear that the legislation did not intend to 
include witness statements to fall within 
the work product protection. However, 
in a response to a discovery request from 
the prosecution, the defense could al-
ways raise a constitutional objection to 
the disclosure of any material including 
statements of witnesses. 
Counsel should review earlier cases 
where the defense made discovery re-
quests and faced government objections 
to disclosure based upon "work-prod-
uct" doctrine. 
In People v. Williams (1979) 93 CaL 
App.3d 40, 155 Cal. Rptr.414, thedefen-
dant was convicted of forcible rape and 
aiding and abetting a rape. Prior to trial, 
the defendant made a discovery motion 
requesting notes of the prosecutors inter-
view with the victim. The trial court de-
nied the request finding that these notes 
were work product. The court of appeals 
reversed finding that the trial court erred 
in admitting the trial testimony of the 
victim from an earlier trial. The court also 
found that it was error for the trial court 
to deny the defendant's discovery re-
quest. The court stated: 
It is well settled that there is no 
attorney's work product privilege 
for statements of witnesses since 
such statements constitute material 
of a non-derivative or non-interpre-
tive nature. (citations omitted). 93 
Cal. App.3d at 64-65. 
In People v. Alexander (1983) 140 Cal. 
App.3d647, 189 Cal. Rptr. 906, thedefen-
dant was convicted, inter alia, with con-
spiracy to commit murder in an incident 
arising out of a prison riot. The defense 
requested discovery of notes made by 
correctional officer and the prosecutors 
as a result of their interviews with in-
mates. The defense claims that these are 
discoverable as they constitute "material 
of a nonderivative or noninterpretive 
nature". 140 CaL 3d at 660. The trial court 
denied this request and the court of ap-
peal upheld the order finding: 
The prosecuting attorney's discus-
sions with inmates appear to have 
been trial preparation rather than in-
vestigative sessions .... [Dlenial of 
access to these notes did not preju-
dice the defense's trial preparation. 
140 Cal. App.3d at 660, 661. 
In People v. Alexander (1982), supra, the 
court applied the work product protec-
tion as defined in the Code of Civil pro-
cedure section 2018. It appears that the 
court did not find the material was abso-
lutely protected under 2018( C), but rather 
that its disclosure could not be com-
pelled under 2018(b). Under the new 
Penal Code section 1054.6, work product 
is protected only if it falls within the ab-
solute protection as defined in Code Civ. 
Pro.2018(c). It is therefore not clear how 
the court will handle this type of request 
in the future. 
J. Work Product Protection Extends to 
Work of Agents of the Attome, 
In People v. Collie (I 981) 30 Cal. 3d 43, 
177 Cal. Rptr. 458,634 P.2d 534, the de-
fendant was charged with attempted 
first degree murder of his wife and at-
tempted second degree murder of his 
child. During trial, a defense witness tes-
tified that she had spoken with a defense 
investigator prior to trial. The prosecu-
tion moved for discovery of the notes 
prepared by the investigator. Over the 
defense objection on the basis of the work 
product doctrine and attorney-client 
privilege, the court ordered production 
of those notes and the defendant was 
convicted. The Ca lifornia Supreme 
Court reversed the conviction based on 
the issue of an improper jury instruction 
on the issue of intent for second degree 
murder. However, the court did find that 
the trial court violated the work product 
privilege in granting the prosecution's 
discovery motion although this error 
was found to be harmless. In discussing 
the application of the work product doc-
trine to criminal cases, the court quoted 
United States v. Nobles, 422 U. S. 225, and 
stated: 
[T]he [work product I privilege 
should extend not just to the attorneys 
'--------------~---------------.-----------------.. --.. --
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work product, but to the efforts of those 
who work with him to prepare the de-
fense: 'At its core, the work product doc-
trine shelters the mental processes of the 
attorney, providing a privileged area 
within which he can analyze and prepare 
his client's case. Hut the doctrine is an 
intensely practical one, grounded in the 
realities of litigation in our adversary 
system. One of those realities is that at-
torneys must often rely on the assistance 
of investigators and other agents in the 
compilation of materials for trial. It is 
therefore necessary that the doctrine pro-
tect material prepared by agents for the 
attorney as well as those prepared by the 
attorney himself'. 30 Cal. 3d at 59. 
In People v. Milner (1988) 45 CaL 3d 
243, 246 Cal. Rptr. 713, the defendant was 
convicted of first degree murder and sen-
tenced to death. At trial, at the request of 
the prosecutor, defense counsel volun-
tarily turned over transcripts of three in-
terviews conducted with the defendant 
by Dr. Solomon. Dr. Solomon was called 
as a defense witness at trial. On appeal, 
the defense alleges that trial counsel was 
ineffective in turning over material that 
he was under no obligation to disclose; 
specifically that these transcripts were 
protected under the attorney-client privi-
lege and the work product doctrine. The 
court of appeals disagreed finding that 
Dr. Solomon was not an agent of the at-
torney. The court held: 
Section 721, subdivision (a) of the 
Evidence Code provides that an ex-
pert witness 'may be fully cross ex-
amined as to ... (3) the matter upon 
which his opinion is based and the 
reasons for his opinion," Once the 
defendant calls an expert to the 
stand, the expert loses his status as 
consulting agent of the attorney, 
and neither the attorney client privi-
lege nor the work product doctrine 
applied to matters relied on or con-
sidered in the formation of his opin-
ion. 45 Cal. 3d at 722. 
In Grand Jury v. Superior Court 
(Harrison) (1989) 259 Cal. Rptr. 404 
(Ca1.App. 4 Dist), the grand jury was in-
vestigating the death of Harrison's ex-
wife. During these proceedings, 
Harrison was referred to as the prime 
suspect. He was represented by an attor-
ney who retained an investigator, 
Braxton. Braxton was subpoenaed to the 
grand jury and asked to identify a wit-
ness to events immediately preceding 
the murder. Braxton refused to answer 
and the court ruled that this information 
was protected under the attorney-client 
privilege. On appeal the defense alleges 
that the governrnenl may not exlract in-
formation from an accused or one of 
his\her agents based upon attorney-cli-
ent privilege, confidential communica-
tions between attorney and client, the 
privilege against self-incrimination, and 
a defendant's right to counsel. The court 
of appeals concluded that under the cir-
cumstances of the case, neither the attor-
ney nor his investigator can be required 
by the grand jury to give testimony con-
cerning the investigation. The court held: 
We hold, however, that the Sixth 
Amendment right of representation of 
counsel, unimpeded by interference of 
the prosecution, together with the privi-
lege against self-incrimination, preclude 
the questioning sought by the district at-
torney in this case. A criminal 
investigator's work product relating to a 
criminal investigation is privilege and 
once it has been established that the in-
vestigator was retained by legal counsel 
hired to represent a suspect, the investi-
gator cannot be forced to reveal the prod-
uct of his investigation. 259 Cal. Rptr. at 
413. 
K. Work Product privilege may be waived 
In United States v. Nobles, (1975) 422 
U.S. 225, the defendant was convicted in 
Federal court on charges arising from an 
armed robbery of a bank. In preparing 
for trial, a defense investigator inter-
viewed the two government witnesses 
and prepared reports reflecting these 
conversations. These reports were used 
during cross examination of these wit-
nesses. During the defense case, the in-
vestigator was called to testify about 
these conversations and complete the 
impeachment of the witnesses. When 
the defense refused to disclose these 
written reports to the prosecutor, the trial 
court would not allow the investigator to 
testify. The Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed the trial court and the U.S. 
Supreme Court found that the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court erred. The Court held that 
while the work product doctrine applies 
to criminal litigation, its protection was 
unavailable in this case. The court stated: 
We need not, however, under-
take here to delineate the scope of 
the [work product] doctrine at trial, 
for in this instance it is clear that the 
defense waived such right as may 
have existed to invoke its protection. 
The privilege derived from the work 
product doctrine is not absolute. Like 
other qualified privileges, it may be 
waived. Here, [the defendant] sought to 
adduce the testimony of the investigator 
and contrast his recollection of the con-
tested statements with that of the 
prosecution's witnesses. [Defendant], by 
electing to present the investigator as a 
witness, waived the privilege with re-
spect to matters covered in his testimony. 
[Defendant] can no more advance the 
work -product doctrine to sustain a uni-
lateral testimonial use of work product 
materials than he could elect to testify in 
his own behalf and thereafter assert his 
Fifth Amendment privilege to resist 
cross examination on matters reasonably 
related to those brought out in direct ex-
amination. 422 U.S. at 2'39-240. 
In People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal. 3d 
713,244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741, the 
defendant was convicted of first degree 
murder, burglary and robbery and was 
sentenced to death. At trial, the defense 
investigator testified about information 
he learned from a government witness 
about who had committed the killing. On 
cross examination, the prosecutor ques-
tioned the investigator about what was 
done upon learning this information. 
The defense objected and argued that 
questions concerning investigatory ef-
forts violated the attorney work -product 
privilege. The court allowed some in-
quiry into action not taken by the inves-
tigator and sustained the other defense 
objections. On appeal, the defense re-
news their objection on work product 
grounds. The court upheld the convic-
tion and found that to the extent the 
privilege applied, it was waived by the 
defense. The court stated: 
Insofar as the [work product] privi-
lege applies to actual testimony in a 
criminal trial, defendant waived it 
when he called his investigator to 
impeach [the government witness] 
Boyd's trial testimony and to bolster 
the claim that [someone else], not 
defendant, was DeSousa's killer. 
Having done so, [the defendant] 
could not suppress, as privileged, 
damaging evidence which was 
.. -~--.. -~~~~------.~-----------' 
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within the scope of his direct exami· 
nation. (citations omitted). He could 
not use the privilege to preserve a 
false aura of veracity for his investi· 
gators testimony. 44 Cal. 3d at 743. 
In Kerns Constr. Cu. u. Superiur 
Court,(1968) 266 Cal. App. 2d 405,411, 72 
CaL Rptr. 74, the defendant's employee 
prepared investigation and accident re-
ports for the defendant concerning the 
accident. The employee had the reports 
in his possession at the time of his depo-
sition and referred to them in order to 
answer questions indicating that he was 
otherwise unable to respond. Following 
the deposition, an opposing party, 
moved for inspection of the documents, 
but the trial court refused to order disclo-
sure. The appellate court directed the 
trial court to compel production on the 
ground that by allowing the employee to 
use the documents to refresh his memory 
at the deposition, counsel for the defen-
dant employer had waived the work 
product protection for the documents. 
The court stated: 
Having no independent memory 
from which [the witness] could an-
swer the questions; having had the 
papers and documents produced by 
Gas Co:s attorney for the benefit 
and use of the witness; having used 
them to give the testimony [that the 
witness] did give, it would be un-
conscionable to prevent the adverse 
party from seeing and obtaining 
copies of them. We conclude there 
was a waiver of any privilege which 
may have existed. 
If, as claimed, the reports were privi-
leged under the work product rule, the 
privilege rested with the attorney and 
was waived by the attorney when he 
[shel produced the reports to the witness 
upon which to premise his testimony. 
The attorney cannot reveal his work 
product, allow a witness to testify there-
from and then claim work product privi-
lege to prevent the opposing party from 
viewing the document from which he 
testified. 
L. lbe "'fraud" exception to the attorney-
client privilege does not apply to Opinion 
work product 
In BP Alaska Exp/orations, Inc. v. Superior 
Court (1988) 199 CaL App. 3d 1240,245 
Volume 6, Number 2 &:1 
Cal. Rptr. 682, the plaintiff, an oil explora-
tion company, sued BP Alaska on numer-
ous theories arising from BP Alaska's al-
legedly unauthorized use of confidential 
oil exploration data furnished to it by 
plaintiffina three-party arrangement that 
excluueu the plaintiff. During discovery, 
plaintiff sought documents prepared by 
or at the direction of BP Alaska's attor-
neys. Although plaintiff conceded that 
this material constituted opinion work 
product, plaintiff argued that it was not 
entitled to work product protection be-
cause the material was obtained in fur-
therance of a fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion to plaintiff by BP Alaska. Plaintiff 
based this argument on Evidence Code 
section 956, which creates an exception to 
the attorney-client privilege when the le-
gal services were sought or obtained to 
enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to 
commit a crime or fraud. The trial court 
granted the motion to compel, holding 
that the plaintiff had established a prima 
facie case of fraud. The appellate court 
disagreed, holding that the absolute pro-
tection for opinion work product is not 
subject to the crime-fraud exception appli-
cable to the attorney-client privilege. The 
court stated: 
[Tlhe absence of a statutory crime-
fraud exception to the work prod uct 
rule implies that the exception does 
not apply to work product docu-
ments. In addition, the language of 
[Code of Civil Procedure section 
20l8(C)1 is absolute. 
M. Work Product protection continues 
even after the case is over 
In Fellows v. Superior Court,(1980) 108 
Cal. App. 3d 55, 62, 166Cal. Rptr. 274, the 
court held that the privilege should not 
be held to terminate simply because the 
litigation or matter in which the 
attorney's work product was created has 
come to an end. 
The court mentioned the policy behind 
the creation of the attorney's work prod-
uct privilege in support of their holding, 
describing the policy as two-fold: 
Nondisclosure of his work product is 
deemed desirable (1) to encourage 
the attorney to make a thorough 
preparation for trial, including the 
analysis of unfavorable aspects of his 
case, as well as the favorable aspects, 
and (2) to prevent one attorney from 
taking undue advantage of another's 
industry and efforts .. (citations omit-
ted) 108 CaI.App.3d at 63. 
In Popelka, Allard, McCowan & Jones ZI. 
Superior Court (1980) 107 Cal. App. 3d 
196,502,165 CaL Rptr. 748, the plaintiff 
sued a law firm and its former client for 
malicious prosecution and sought infor-
mation from the law firm's inter-office 
memoranda concerning the prior case. 
The court held the work product protec-
tion afforded these documents did not 
end when the case terminated. Reason-
ing that the primary purpose of the 
rule---encouraging full and fair repre-
sentation of a client and being able to 
prepare a case without fear of subse-
quent scrutiny by opposing parties-
was not sufficiently served by a privilege 
that lived only until termination of the 
action, the court stated: 
The instant case illustrates the force 
behind such reasoning and we 
therefore hold that the privilege ex-
tends beyond the termination of the 
litigation for which the documents 
were prepared. 
N. Laying Foundation to Establish 
existence of Work Product Privilege 
To make a prima facie showing that 
the absolute work product privilege is 
applicable, a person claiming the work 
product protection must establish the 
following preliminary facts: (1) that a cli-
ent sought the attorney's legal counsel, 
(2) that the matter sought to be protected 
is derived from the attorney's initiative 
in the course of providing legal counsel, 
(3) that the matter sought to be protected 
reflects the attorney's impressions, con-
clusions, opinions, legal research, or le-
gal theories, and (4) that the matter 
sought to be protected is in writing. 
Williamson v. Superior Court of Los Ange-
les,(1978) 21 Cal. 3d 829,834,148 Cal. 
Rptr. 39, 582 P.2d 126; Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co. v. Superior Court ,(1984) 153 
Cal. App. 3d 467, 478, 200 Cal. Rptr. 471; 
Merritt v. Superior Court,(1970) 9 Cal. 
App. 3d 721, 731, 88 Cal. Rptr. 337; see 
Mize v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co.,(1975) 
46 CaL App. 3d 436,447,120 CaL Rptr. 
787 (party claiming protection must al-
lege preliminary facts showing existence 
of work product). 
23 
